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Abstract 
 
This paper is motivated by the overall trend of decreasing youth voter turnout since the 
1960s in the U.S, which has been accompanied by large fluctuations in turnout between election 
cycles. By contrast, older age groups vote at higher rates with less variation in turnout between 
elections over time. This paper aims to identify some independent variables that affect youth 
voter turnout rate and its’ fluctuation over time. Using American National Election Survey data, 
a correlation is observed between certain candidate character traits and youth voter turnout. 
This study focuses on a candidate’s morality and intelligence by studying these traits’ 
independent effect on youth voter turnout over time. By conducting two online experiments with 
295 participants aged 18-24, this study found that subjects who received a cue about a 
candidate’s morality were more likely to vote and participate in an election than if they did not 
receive that cue. Among 18-24 year olds, a perceived positive intelligence cue resulted in a 
higher commitment to vote and participate as opposed to receiving no cue. The unintelligent cue 
had no intended treatment effect. Furthermore, the study found that the observed increase in a 
commitment to participate for both studies was stronger for low cost forms of participation, such 
as voting than high cost forms of participation, such as canvassing. Finally, among 18-24 year 
olds, race and age act as moderating variables on the effect that candidate morality has on 
voting behavior. Age, but not race, acts as a moderating variable on the effect that candidate 
intelligence has on voting behavior. This study contributes to the field by identifying variables 
that might be predictive of youths’ voting behavior in future elections. Additionally, this study 
adds to the body of motivating factors for voter turnout theory more broadly.  
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Introduction 
This paper begins with an overview of the history of youth voter laws and youth voting 
turnout trends at the national level. Youth voter turnout has decreased over time and fluctuated 
from election to election within this broader trend. The Introduction uses these empirical data as 
the starting point for the research question: What factor(s) could be motivating young individuals 
to turnout in one election cycle but not in the subsequent election? The answer to this question 
necessarily lies in a variable that can change from one election to the next. After an analysis of 
cumulative data file from the American National Election Survey (2010), this paper identifies 
perceived cues about a candidate’s morality and intelligence as potential factors affecting youth 
turnout. Finally, this section discusses the results of two experiments, “Experiment 1: Morality” 
and “Experiment 2: Intelligence,” and how these variables affect youth political participation. 
1971 marked a particularly interesting landmark for American politics—particularly for 
the spirit of an inclusive democracy. Congress passed an amendment to the Constitution 
lowering the voting age from 21 to 18 in an effort to ignite the political hearts of young people. 
Indeed, one major intention of this amendment was capturing youth interest in politics before it 
was too late. Largely, this effort reflected an early observation among the political elite that 
young people were not voting at the same rates as their older counterparts. This observation 
turned out to be an ongoing trend in American politics. Hopeful at the time, however, many 
elites believed this was simply because young people hadn’t been offered a chance to engage 
politically early enough in their lives (Wattenberg 2006).  
 The 26th Amendment, however, did not have the intended effect of increasing 
youth voter turnout. The 1972 presidential elections resulted in a dismally low voter turnout rate 
among newly enfranchised 18-20 year olds compared to any other age group, with only 48% 
turning up to the polls (Wattenberg 2006). Since 1972, there has been ongoing debate about why 
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young people systematically vote at lower rates than their older counterparts. Markedly, there 
has been little speculation about why this gap has widened steadily and fluctuated dramatically 
(A. Martin 2012; U.S Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, select years). Indeed, there is 
much more variation in turnout among 18-24 year olds from election to election than any other 
age group. For those aged 65 and up, the percent of the electorate that turns out is constant and 
predictable (with a standard deviation of 4.8% across 18 election cycle values). By contrast, 18-
24 year olds have steadily voted less over time with greater variation of turnout from election to 
election (with a standard deviation of 10.8 across 18 election cycle values) (Pomante and 
Schraufnagel 2014, 2). This suggests some variable is affecting youths but not affecting older 
cohorts’ voting behavior. This study identified “perceived candidate morality” and “perceived 
candidate intelligence” as correlative variables with voter turnout among youths using ANES 
cumulative data. The ANES data, however, cannot draw a causal link between the independent 
variables (candidate traits) and the dependent variables (youth political participation). To test the 
causal relationship of candidate traits on youth turnout, two experiments, involving 295 subjects 
aged 18-24, were conducted. Subjects were treated with candidate flyers for fictitious 
gubernatorial elections to test the effect of candidate morality (experiment 1) and candidate 
intelligence (experiment 2) on voting behavior. 
“Experiment 1: Morality” found that when youths are cued with either highly moral or 
immoral candidate flyers, they are more likely to commit to voting than when no cue is given.  
“Experiment 2: Intelligence” resulted in a higher rate of political participation when a candidate 
appeared highly intelligent than when a candidate appeared unintelligent or when no intelligence 
cue was given. Finally, both experiments found a positive correlation between taking pride in a 
candidate and candidate morality and intelligence. Because “taking pride in a candidate” is 
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difficult to operationalize using candidate flyers in an experimental setting, future study is 
needed to test the causal relationship between taking pride in a candidate and youth voter 
turnout.  
First, it is important to clarify why it matters if young people vote, since they comprise 
only a small portion of the eligible voting population. 
Why Youth Turnout Matters   
             One argument is that while voting is not the only way to be civically engaged, it 
serves as an appropriate proxy, or thermometer, for other civic behavior. Given that voting 
serves as a proxy, it is troubling if young citizens don’t vote in part because this translates to a 
lack of civic engagement across other areas like community leadership or volunteer efforts. The 
second reason voting matters is because it is “the defining feature of the democratic process,” 
(Dalton 2005, 4) and the best equalizer of citizens into political entities (Verba et al., 12). The 
health of the political system relies on a certain faith and participation within that system. 
Finally, the fewer people, and thus interests, expressed through voting enables narrow interest 
groups to capture the political front (Teixera 1987, 4).  
 The third reason why it’s important to study voter behavior among young people lies in 
practical application.  Teasing out the predictors of low participation lends itself to a potential 
prescription in the face of a political paradox. This Paradox of Participation (Brody 1978) states 
that despite fewer barriers, higher education, and more readily available information, young 
people are continuously voting less since the 1980s (Teixera 1987, 3). This paradox presents a 
motivating question for political scientists: “Have we misidentified the factors that influence 
voting patterns among youths?” If this is the case, there are two possibilities as to why this has 
happened. The first possibility is that what brings young people to the polls is different than for 
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older voters, and has not been identified since the ratification of the 26th Amendment. 
Alternatively, the inability to account for youth voter turnout fluctuation (and it’s recent decline) 
may be the result of a new variable affecting youth turnout in the face of a changing social and 
political landscape. For example, relatively new trends among youths, such as a decrease in 
conventional community engagement and an increase in community service, have emerged since 
the 1970s that did not exist historically (Syvertsen et al. 2011).  
 Due to the cross-sectional nature of this study, only the first possibility can be explored. 
If the motivating behavior to vote among youths is a recent change, future research will need to 
address this through longitudinal and historical study. In this study, a consideration of why 
youths are unaccounted for among existing theories is addressed without undertaking the issue of 
changing motivations across time. Existing theories, presented below under Existing Voter 
Turnout Theories, successfully predict voting rates across a host of variables for older 
generations through time. However, these theories do not explain the slight trending decline in 
youth turnout in recent presidential elections or the wide variation in turnout from one 
presidential election to the next. 
Existing Voter Turnout Theories  
 This section introduces the existing theories for voter turnout behavior and their 
explanatory power for the current trends in turnout among youths. The main theories presented 
in this section can be grouped into cost-benefit analysis theories, behavioral voting theories, and 
cohort theories. Each overarching theoretical framework, and each theory within that framework, 
accounts for some piece of the puzzle that motivates voting behavior among youths. Some 
theories are interrelated, and some are at odds with one another. This section compares the 
existing theories in the literature and notes a fundamental gap across the board. None of the 
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theories can account for the fluctuation from election to election in youth voter turnout or 
declining turnout in youth voting patterns over time.  
Indeed, the problem with these theories is that each fail to explain one of two phenomena, 
or both. The first gap in the literature is that as a general trend young people are voting less and 
less with each decade since the 1980’s than their previous counterparts. The second issue at hand 
is that these theories cannot account for what Aaron Martin (2012) has identified as “volatile 
voting behavior.” The American National Election Survey (ANES), a comprehensive 
presidential and midterm election survey conducted since 1952, reveals a widening gap in the 
overall turnout rate between cohorts, which is punctuated by distinctive spikes and dips. Young 
people turned out in droves for Kennedy in 1960, Clinton in 1992, and again in 2008 for Obama, 
with smaller fluctuations throughout the period (A. Martin 2012, Plutzer 2002). Noteworthy is 
the subsequent decline in turnout for Clinton in 1996 and for Obama in 2012 among the same 
age group, suggesting “Clinton” and “Obama” are not in themselves explanatory variables. The 
overwhelming trend has been a widening gap between middle aged and young voters since the 
1980s, from about 11 percentage points to a high of 27 points in 1988. 
Voter Turnout Between Cohorts Over Time 
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Cost-Benefit Analysis Theories 
 The factors that influence whether or not an individual votes in a particular election are 
sometimes understood in terms of a cost-benefit analysis: people must weigh the costs of 
registering and voting against the benefits of participation. The costs are always non-zero. They 
include travel time to the polls, registration, and political education. Furthermore, the benefits 
often appear very close to zero as people consider the likelihood that their vote bears weight on 
the election outcome. However, benefits can include an array of less tangible things, termed 
“expressive benefits,” which include fulfilling a duty towards a party or candidate or voting for a 
cause (Teixera 1987).  While cost-benefit analyses may explain why any given person may or 
may not vote, and may identify environmental or situational factors that contribute to the costs or 
benefits of voting, they cannot account for the relevant behavioral factors affecting voting. 
Behavioral factors include habituation to voting or peer pressure (Campbell 2006). These 
behavioral factors are discussed in the next subsection.  
 Another type of cost-benefit analysis framework in the literature focuses on resource 
availability (Plutzer 2002, 41). Resources can function as an elimination to barriers that might 
otherwise be considered costs. Instead, researchers have found that resources—including 
education, socioeconomic status, and political knowledge—is associated with higher levels of 
turnout (Plutzer 2002, 41). However, neither Teixera’s cost-benefit analysis nor Plutzer’s 
resource framework have been integrated into a holistic approach that captures longitudinal 
changes in voter turnout, or fluctuation among different age groups of the population (Plutzer 
2002; Wolfinger 2007).  
 A third type of cost-benefit analysis is introduced by Wattenberg (2006), which focuses 
on the availability of information and its ability to inform the voter of the benefits of voting. In 
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other words, the more information a voter has on an issue, the more likely he or she will find it 
beneficial to vote on the issue. Wattenberg goes on to introduce a paradox: he notes that despite 
increasing access to information, young people are less likely to become informed. Lower rates 
of T.V watching, newspaper reading, and knowledge of public affairs result in young people not 
caring who wins; people vote when they care who wins (Wattenberg 2006). This theory may be 
able to explain the spike in 2008 when candidates or issues successfully captivated the interests 
of youths through the media. However, it still doesn’t successfully account for why young people 
were captivated by these issues in the first place.  
 A fourth theory under the umbrella of cost-benefit analysis moves beyond discussion on 
resource constraints to incorporate emotionality in voting theory. While this theory relies on 
behavioral drives (emotions) that influence voting behavior, Marcus and Mackuen situate their 
theory in the broader cost-benefit analysis (Marcus and Mackuen 1993). They find that perceived 
candidate traits can be understood as an emotional response to information in an election cycle. 
These scholars found that voter anxiety and enthusiasm vary with both elections and political 
events, and do not remain static within an individual (Marcus and Mackuen 1993, 672). In 
summation, emotions are short term and therefore may generate political attentiveness in one 
election and not in another. Most importantly for the study done and discussed in this paper, 
Marcus and Mackuen found that political leaders can generate these emotions in voters.  
Behavioral Voting Theories 
 Theories that take components of the human behavior into account often draw a causal 
link between peer pressure, persistence (long-term habituation), inertia (short-term habituation), 
or social attitudes with an increased likelihood of voting. This varies from a cost-benefit analysis 
in that a voter may be unaware of the psychological or behavioral factors driving him or her to 
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vote, such as habituation. One theory that takes into account the behavior behind voting was 
introduced by Joseph Nye, and could give rise to a general lack of voting among 18-25 year olds. 
Here, I have termed it Disaffected Youth Theory. Nye notes that in 1964, three quarters of 
Americans “trusted the government to do the right thing most of the time,” and this had declined 
to a mere quarter of respondents by 1997 (Nye 1997, 1). Similarly, confidence in institutions, 
such as churches and companies had declined from the 1960s to the 1990s. While a healthy dose 
of skepticism has always existed in American politics, a lack of trust could explain changing 
incentives to vote in the overarching cost-benefit analysis. However, Nye’s Disaffected Youth 
Theory does not explain the wide fluctuation in youth turnout across elections. If trust in 
government has steadily declined from the 1960s to 1990s, the  spikes in turnout among youths 
remains unexplained. 
 Another theory, introduced by Wolfinger and Rosenstone, could be viewed as a hybrid 
between a cost-benefit analysis voting theory and a behavioral voting theory. It is grouped with 
the latter, however, due to its reliance on a psychological habituation to voting. Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone (2007) built on the existing scholarship that correlates higher educational attainment 
(resource availability theory) with increased voter turnout. They argue that life experience can 
eventually substitute a formal education in predicting voting patterns. Plutzer has confirmed this 
finding, noting that “life experience” mediates at least a third of the effect that higher education 
has on voting (Plutzer 2002, 42). Indeed, the voter turnout gap between those with and without a 
college degree closes significantly with age (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 2007, 60). Milbrath 
(1965) suggests this illustrates a psychological habituation to voting that deepens with 
reinforcement. This theory explains why young people vote at lower rates than their 
counterparts, but cannot explain turnout fluctuation over time.  
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 A third theory that relies heavily on behavioral phenomena to explain voting behavior is 
Plutzer’s Developmental Theory. This is the most comprehensive longitudinal theory that 
accounts for voter turnout steadily increasing with age, yet eventually leveling off. Much like 
Nye’s theory, Plutzer relies on some cost-benefit and resource availability theories to inform his 
own. Plutzer argues that while initial resources, costs, and political environmental affect one’s 
likelihood of voting for the first time when they become eligible, there is also an effect of inertia. 
As the costs of voting decrease, the resources increase. Thus, participation in elections increases. 
Indeed, Plutzer accounts for the consistent voter turnout among older cohorts by discussing these 
phenomena through a behavioral lens of inertia. He writes that the habituation to voting is not 
exactly persistence, but instead dependent on more recent voting patterns. In other words, once 
an individual is on the “voting bandwagon,” he or she isn’t likely to get off. 
 This is supported by the fact that in a self-reporting NES panel study, only 3% of people 
who voted in 1968 and 1972 did not vote subsequently in either 1974 and 1976 (Plutzer 2002, 
43). Plutzer’s theory does the most comprehensive job of explaining why fluctuations between 
elections do not affect older generations. However, start-up costs do not differ dramatically or 
homogenously from one election cycle to the next. Thus, we are left with youth voter 
fluctuations largely unaccounted for. Clearly, the existing literature is rich with developed 
theories that anticipate the factors that might make an individual, including young person, vote in 
each election. However, none have successfully accounted for the spikes and dips in turnout 
from one election to the next, which define 18 to 24 year olds’ voting patterns.  
A fourth theory considers the distinct properties of a generation on voting behavior. This 
theory provides a socialization explanation for each generation’s voting behavior. In other words, 
the distinctive property of each cohort is not the age of that cohort, but the socialization climate 
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in which those individuals were raised. The Generational Effect posits that political socialization 
creates lasting effects that mediate current political landscapes (Miller 1992). Ultimately, this 
second theory accounts for ‘persistence’—meaning that the long-term individual tendency to be 
a voter, or nonvoter, is mediated by events in one’s formative years. Persistence and inertia are 
similar behavioral tendencies, and thus The Generational Effect is also informed by a behavioral 
theoretical lens. The Generational Effect also has the benefit of explaining steady voter decline 
since 1980 in the face of technological ease and the steady erosion of barriers to voting (U.S 
Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Select Years). Based on The Generational Effect, we 
would expect non-voters to remain non-voters later in life as it is a product of their socialization, 
and this has been the case. The current population survey shows a slight decline in turnout in 
every age group over since the 1980s. Cost-benefit analysis theories cannot explain this decline 
in turnout among all voters; on a cost-benefit or resource theory, the erosion of barriers should 
result in increased voter turnout over time as barriers are reduced.   
 Reduction in barriers to voting incorporates cost-benefit analysis theories, further 
nuancing this behavioral theory. This cost-benefit component of The Generational Effect adds an 
explanatory edge over cohort theories in that the former accounts for the young people who do 
vote: they are formally educated and able to grasp theoretical and abstract ideas (Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 2007, 60). Universities themselves provide extra-curriculum and communities for 
civic engagement, which might otherwise not be had. Again, this theory cannot fully account for 
decreased voter turnout or fluctuating rates, as the rates of college attendance have gone up since 
1980. However, Plutzer (2002) notes that homogenous and largely non-voting environments, like 
colleges, may encourage young people to think that voting is not important.   
A fifth theory that falls under the behavioral theory umbrella in the literature utilizes 
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Social Identity Theory to explain voting behavior. Recently, Pomante and Schraufnagel (2014) 
have suggested that the widening gap between youths and older cohorts in turnout may be 
attributed to Social Identity Theory, which hypothesizes that in an absence of developed stances 
on political issues, young people vote for candidates who are like them: namely youthful. Their 
study used photographs of political candidates, which measured a commitment to vote in an 
election, but did not measure a voter’s choice for any particular candidate. They found that 
Social Identity Theory is attributable to young voters’ voting behavior. Sigelman and Sigelman 
(1982) found similar results using written descriptions of fictional candidates.  
While these experiments are an important component in identifying the causal factors of 
youth participation, they do not fully capture youths’ voting behavior. For example, in the 2016 
primaries Senator Sanders earned 2,052,082 total votes from 18-24 year olds while Mr. Trump 
and Secretary Clinton collectively received only 1,595,100 votes in that cohort (CIRCLE, Tufts 
College of Civic Life 2016, 3).  The experiment conducted here uses a similar experimental 
design to Sigelman and Sigelman’s (1982) by creating fictional candidate profiles. However, this 
design incorporates emotional voting behavior theories and high correlations observed in the 
ANES data to evaluate the effects of perceived morality and intelligence on young people’s 
voting patterns. 
Theories that depend largely on human behavioral phenomena also tend to incorporate 
cost-benefit analyses or cohort theories. Ultimately, these theories are dependent upon the 
context in which human behavioral phenomena develop.   
Cohort Theories 
 Cohort theories are informed by the differences between cohorts (age groups or 
generations) to account for voting behavior. The dominant cohort theory in the literature is The 
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Lifecycle Effect. The Lifecycle Effect attributes low voter turnout among youths to the typical 
circumstances present in American life during one’s younger years (A. Martin 2012, 21; Pacheco 
2008, 415).  This theory posits that young people don’t vote simply in virtue of their 
youthfulness. As the responsibilities of adulthood and stability come into focus, there is an 
increased incentive to vote (A. Martin 2012, 21). The Lifecycle Effect has the advantage of 
successfully predicting that as generations age, regardless of socialization climate, their voter 
turnout increases.  
Clearly, grouping existing voter turnout theories into three categories cost-benefit 
theories, behavioral voting theories, and cohort theories does not result in three uniformly 
distinct groups. The literary landscape is messy, and each type of theory incorporates some 
information from another type. However, categorizing theories this way is useful for comparing 
the existing theories. This study is intended to address the gap in the literature that cannot predict 
the volatility in youth turnout from election to election. None of the theories can account for the 
fluctuation over time in youth voter turnout and declining turnout. The gaps in the literature 
around volatile voting behavior among youths and lower turnout in recent decades is the focus of 
this experiment.  
Candidate Traits and Youth Voter Turnout 
 This section focuses on establishing the correlation between candidate traits and youth 
voter turnout in a national election. Establishing this correlation is the first step in identifying a 
variable set that might affect younger voters’ political participation. This section first reiterates 
why candidate traits are worth studying and then goes on to discuss the correlation between 
candidate traits and youth turnout as observed by the American National Election Survey. 
Finally, this section discusses the strengths and limitations of this source, and the need for an 
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experimental setting to identify if there is a causal relationship between candidate traits and 
youth turnout. 
  In order to build a comprehensive picture of the causal factors that might account for 
both a general trend in decreased voting and account for substantial fluctuation among young 
people, it is necessary to develop a hypothesis that is election cycle, and thus, candidate 
dependent. Indeed, if U.S population demographics, such as educational attainment and political 
knowledge are relatively steady across election cycles, then I hypothesize that the perception of 
the candidates themselves are affecting first time voting rates. It is worth noting that this 
explanatory variable reflects perceived and dynamic character traits and not policy proposals or 
fixed candidate identity. Fixed traits such as race and sex cannot account for why candidates face 
a disaffected youth upon reelection, unless the electorate has changed its perception of those 
traits. For example, race is a fixed trait but the electorate has changed it perception of black 
candidates over time.  
Based on data provided by the American National Election Survey cumulative data file 
(1964-2012), perceived presidential candidate traits including perceived pride in a candidate, 
candidate knowledgeability, and candidate morality are correlated positively with higher rates of 
voter turnout. This data set is a cross-sectional, equal probability sample that asks questions of 
the electorate before and after national elections. It aims to analyze change over time in political 
behavior, and is thus useful in tracking candidate perception over time (ANES 2010, 
www.electionsurvey.org).   
 The ANES Cumulative Time series (1948-2012) is a comprehensive face-to-face self-
administered election survey that aggregates questions that have been asked in at least three 
presidential election cycles into a single file available to the public. The sample size varies from 
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election year to election year, usually falling between 1,000-3,000 respondents; the smallest 
sample size was 662 respondents, in 1948, and the largest was 5,914, in 2012. The ANES is 
conducted across the 48 continental states in English or Spanish. Respondents who did not 
complete both a pre- and post-election survey in any given cycle were treated as missing values. 
While the exact wording of the questions has changed across elections, this is only to reflect the 
political context of the day (ANES 2010 electionsurvey.org). 
 Using STATA (2014) programming, a comparison of respondents’ answers was done for 
different questions across time, and controlling for certain demographics—including age. 
Through by-sorting perceived candidate traits by age across time, correlations appear between 
youth voter turnout and young people’s perceptions of candidates among a few specific 
candidate traits. Question thermometers in multiple presidential election cycles gauge feelings on 
a scale of 1-4 for perceived qualities of the Democratic and Republican candidates such as 
knowledge, decency, compassion, inspiration, and morality. A 1 is coded as the response for a 
candidate “extremely” exhibiting the trait, 2 represents the variable value for exhibiting the 
quality “quite well,” while 3 is “not too well” and 4 is “not well at all.” Other answers including 
“don’t know” and “missing” are treated as missing values. 
 Although the general decline in voter turnout began in the 1970s, this study incorporates 
7 ANES turnout results beginning with Reagan’s election in 1980 and ending with Obama’s in 
2008 because questions about candidate traits were not asked in the ANES pre-election survey 
before 1980. The 2008 election has a significant amount of data coded as missing because nearly 
half of respondents did not complete the first wave of the panel study. Thus, for some candidate 
traits the 2008 data is not used to draw correlations with youth voter turnout because of the much 
smaller sample size.  
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 Many of the candidate traits show weak or spurious relationships with youth turnout. For 
example, perceptions of a candidate as inspiring, compassionate, or decent does not vary with 
high or low turnout among youths. However, perceived candidate morality, intelligence and 
pride in candidate are all correlated with voter turnout across election cycles among 18-24 year 
olds, particularly for the Republican candidates. The correlation between turnout and taking 
pride in a candidate is presented below. For, Democrats the correlation between pride and 
turnout holds up across three of the seven election cycles studied. For Republicans, the 
correlation between pride and youth voter turnout is observed for six of the seven elections 
studied. The bolded rows highlight where a positive correlation held up between turnout and the 
candidate trait for the two major parties. 
The question “Candidate affects—Proud” is a binary variable that measures whether a 
respondent takes pride in the candidate in the pre-election survey. A 1 is coded as “Yes I have 
felt pride in the candidate” and a 2 is coded as “No, I have not felt pride in the candidate.” This 
trait showed the strongest correlation across the seven election cycles studied. Since pride 
resulted in the strongest correlation, the study done for this paper will focus on identifying a 
correlation between pride and morality and intelligence. If this correlation holds in my 
experiment, which does not directly test a causal relationship between pride and turnout, this 
provides an opportunity for future research. Indeed, if pride covaries with cues about morality 
and intelligence, which in turn are predictive of youth turnout, then pride may be a third 
predictive variable of youth turnout. Below, the relationship between pride and turnout for 
Democratic and Republican is presented candidates through the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s.  
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Democratic Presidential Candidates: Correlating Pride and Turnout 
Year Youth Turnout Percent of youths who have felt Pride in the Candidate 
1980 40%  44.83% 
1984 41%  29.55% 
1988 36%  (-) 22.77%  (-) 
1992 42% (+) 25.79%  (+) 
1996 32%  55.56% 
2000 32% 32.88% 
2004 41% 30.71% 
2008 44% (+) 58.37% (+) 
 
Republican Presidential Candidates: Correlating Pride and Turnout 
 
Year Youth Turnout Percent of youths who have felt Pride in the Candidate 
1980 40%  23.28% 
1984 41% (+) 52.94% (+) 
1988 36%  (-) 33.17%  (-) 
1992 42% (+) 54.30%  (+) 
1996 32%  (-) 22.22% (-) 
2000 32% (=) 22.60% (=) 
2004 41% (+) 55.12% (+) 
2008 44%  23.08% 
 
The correlations between candidate traits and youth turnout are presented in the table 
below. For morality, a correlation between high levels of morality and youth turnout is shown. 
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For knowledgeability, a correlation between low levels of knowledgeability and youth turnout is 
shown. Again, the correlation holds strongest for Republican candidates. The four tables suggest 
that when youths are given a strong cue about candidate morality or intelligence, they are more 
likely to vote. The strength of the relationship varies dramatically, and is at times spurious, 
which necessitates an experimental study to evaluate a potential causal relationship between the 
variables. For democrats, the correlation held up across three of six elections. For Republicans, 
the correlation held up for five of the six elections studied. 
Democratic Presidential Candidates: Correlating Morality and Turnout 
Year Youth Turnout Percent of youths who saw candidate as “Extremely” Moral 
1980 40%  18.53% 
1984 41%  15.12% 
1988 36% (-) 3.47%  (-) 
1992 42% (+) 6.79% (+) 
1996 32% (-) 3.34%  (-) 
2000 32%  19.86% 
2004 41%  11.02% 
2008 44%  N/A (49.77% of respondents coded as missing) 
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Republican Presidential Candidates: Correlating Morality and Turnout 
 
Year Youth Turnout Percent of youths who saw candidate as “Extremely” Moral 
1980 40%  9.91% 
1984 41% (+) 22.34% (+) 
1988 36% (-) 16.83% (-) 
1992 42% (+) 19.91% (+) 
1996 32%  (-) 13.86% (-) 
2000 32%  11.64% 
2004 41% (+) 16.54% (+) 
2008 44%  N/A (49.77% of respondents coded as missing) 
 
The correlations between perceiving a candidate as highly moral varies with turnout 
when looking at both Republicans and Democrats across time, particularly with Republicans. 
The only year for which this relationship is not observed for either candidate is in 2000, when 
voter turnout remained the same from the previous election—and the Republican candidate was 
perceived as less moral than the previous candidate and the Democratic candidate was perceived 
as more moral than the candidate. Thus, I hypothesize that candidate morality is affecting youth 
voter turnout.  
Since perceived candidate morality and voter turnout are correlated (particularly for 
Republican candidates) it is important to consider if looking at negative candidate traits produces 
the same correlation. This may illustrate protest voting. The correlations for “not at all 
knowledgeable” and youth voter turnout are only observed in two consecutive election cycles 
among Democratic candidates and with little strength. However, perceived unintelligence and 
youth turnout vary together across at least four of the election cycles for Republican nominees. 
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This might be due to young liberal idealists voting against conservative candidates who they find 
unknowledgeable. The study conducted for this paper will explore the possibility for protest 
voting by looking at both high and low levels of candidate morality and its effect on turnout; the 
experiment will also study the effect of both high and low levels of intelligence on youth voter 
turnout.   
In the ANES data, perceived candidate lack of knowledge is weakly correlated with 
increased youth voter turnout; two of six presidential elections among Democratic candidates 
resulted in a correlation with youth turnout and candidate unintelligence. For Republicans, the 
correlation held up across four of the six elections studied. However, perceived intelligence in a 
candidate is hypothesized to be positively correlated with feelings of pride. In this study, 
intelligence is used to operationalize perceived candidate knowledgeability. In the section 
Morality, Intelligence and Pride, the positive correlation between high morality, high 
intelligence, increased feelings of pride, and increased voter turnout is discussed.  
Democratic Presidential Candidates: Correlating Low Knowledgeability and Turnout  
Year Youth Turnout Percent of youths who saw candidate as “Not at all” Knowledgeable 
1980 40%  3.83% 
1984 41% 1.72%  
1988 36%  (-) 3.47%  (-) 
1992 42% (+) 3.62% (+) 
1996 32%   5.13% 
2000 32%  2.74% 
2004 41%  2.36% 
2008 44%  N/A (49.77% of respondents coded as missing) 
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Republican Presidential Candidates: Correlating Unintelligence and Turnout 
 
Year Youth Turnout Percent of youths who saw candidate as “Not at all” Knowledgeable 
1980 40%  7.33% 
1984 41%  6.53%  
1988 36%  (-) 2.48%  (-) 
1992 42% (+) 2.71%  (+) 
1996 32%  (-) 0.85% (-) 
2000 32%  6.85% 
2004 41% (+) 19.96%  (+) 
2008 44%  N/A 
 
 Since this study relies largely on the ANES Cumulative Data file, it is important to 
acknowledge its strengths and weaknesses. The longitudinal and national nature of the ANES 
data makes it particularly valuable for identifying persistent factors that affect youth voter 
turnout by fortifying its external validity. External validity is the extent to which data accurately 
reflect the real world. Another related strength of the ANES data is the cross sectional equal 
probabilistic nature of the sample, which ensures that no segment of the population is 
underrepresented.  
The ANES cumulative data file also has weaknesses, however.  Due to the extensive list 
of variables that could be affecting survey answers in a national survey on presidential elections, 
it is difficult to isolate the intended variable. The benefit of conducting a controlled experiment 
lies in the ability to isolate the intended variable for precision, resulting in higher internal 
validity. Internal validity is the extent to which the results of an experiment reflect the changes of 
the intended independent variable studied. While an experiment with a much smaller sample size 
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will not provide the same external validity as the ANES cumulative data, this study seeks to test 
a causal account of the observed correlations in the ANES data.  
Hypotheses  
Having identified these two candidate traits as variable trends in youth turnout over time 
in the ANES data, this study seeks to reproduce these correlations in a two-part experiment. The 
Hypotheses section raises five hypotheses tested in the experiment that are supported by the 
ANES cumulative data and existing voter turnout theories.  
Hypothesis 1: Among 18-24 year olds, elections with a candidate who is perceived as 
highly moral or immoral will produce a stronger commitment to vote and participate than in an 
election without such a candidate. Importantly, this hypothesis predicts that any cue about 
morality—positive or negative—will increase voter turnout. This hypothesis is supported by the 
correlation between youth voter turnout and the morality of real candidates in the ANES data 
file.  
The second hypothesis pertains to the second trait studied in this experiment, intelligence. 
Hypothesis 2: Among 18-24 year olds, elections with a candidate who is perceived as intelligent 
or unintelligent will produce a stronger commitment to vote and participate than in an election 
without such a candidate. This study uses “perceived intelligence” instead of “perceived 
knowledgeability.” The Mariam Webster Dictionary defines knowledgeability as “having or 
showing knowledge or intelligence.” Thus, this study functions under the assumption that 
intelligence and knowledge convey the same trait. Furthermore, an intelligence cue is easier to 
operationalize on a pamphlet than specific issue knowledgeability. Therefore, measuring 
candidate intelligence provides a greater opportunity to evoke the intended treatment effect. 
 26 
 The third hypotheses states that: Among 18-24 year olds, candidates who are perceived 
as highly intelligent or highly moral are more likely to be a candidate to take pride in than 
candidates who are not perceived as highly intelligent or moral. Since pride in a candidate is 
most strongly correlated with youth voter turnout, but also difficult to capture as an independent 
variable, intelligence and morality will serve as correlative variables. This experiment 
hypothesizes that taking pride in a candidate will increase among 18 to 24 year olds when the 
candidate is also perceived as highly moral or highly intelligent.  
The fourth and fifth hypotheses address moderating variables examined in  
the literature review of voter turnout theory. According to behavioral theories of voting, we 
would anticipate that voter identity might moderate the effect of the independent variable 
(character trait) on political participation. Hypothesis 4: Among 18-24 year olds, age will have a 
moderating effect on the interaction between the candidate traits and self-reported political 
participation. The fifth hypothesis anticipates that age, even within a single generation, can 
moderate the effect of candidate traits on political participation. Hypothesis 5: Among 18-24 year 
olds, race will have a moderating effect on the interaction between the candidate traits and self-
reported political participation.  
Experimental Design 
 In this section, the experiment designed to test the five hypotheses is presented in detail. 
The experiment was designed specifically to test a causal relationship between some of the 
correlations observed in the cumulative ANES data file as well as some of the theories in the 
existing literature on youth turnout.   
 In order to test these five hypotheses, two separate experiments were designed using 
fictitious election materials and survey software on Qualtrics.com (Appendix 1). The first 
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experiment will refer to the experiment that tests the first, third, fourth, and fifth hypotheses. The 
second experiment will refer to the experiment that tests the second, third, fourth, and fifth 
hypotheses. In other words, the first experiment studied the effect of the candidate trait morality 
(independent variable) by using fictitious election flyers on young individuals’ commitment to 
participate in elections through voting, encouraging peers to vote, canvassing, and donating 
money to a campaign (dependent variables). The second experiment studied the effect of the 
candidate trait intelligence (independent variable), again, by using fictitious election flyers on 
young individuals’ commitment to participate in elections through voting, encouraging peers to 
vote, canvassing and donating money to a campaign (dependent variables). This notation is 
merely nominal, as the order of experiments was randomized when assigned to subjects. This 
randomization is intended to nullify any effect of conducting one experiment before the other. 
Each respondent got one of three flyers (independent variable treatments) for each experiment. 
The experiments studied the effect of moderating variables by asking respondents about their 
demographical background.  
 The experiment was introduced to subjects with a consent form followed by a “Purpose 
Statement,” written below: 
In some research studies, the investigators cannot tell you exactly what the study is about 
before you participate in the study. We will describe the tasks in the study in a general 
way, but we can't explain the real purpose of the study until after you complete these 
tasks. When you are done, we will explain why we are doing this study, what we are 
looking at, and any other information you should know about this study. 
 
At the end of the study, the respondents were offered this fuller explanation of the 
purpose of the experiment:  
Thank you for participating in this survey! Now that it is over, I am happy to tell you 
what we are researching.  
Each candidate flyer you looked at was intended to cue a specific personality trait in that 
candidate. Either the candidate flyer was intended to evoke a relatively moral or immoral 
 28 
candidate, or an intelligent or unintelligent one. You may also have randomly been 
assigned to the control group; these flyers didn't have any particular personality traits. I 
am looking to see if, and how, young people respond differently to these two personality 
traits when they think about voting in an election.  
  
After the consent and purpose statement, subjects were prompted with these directions: 
Directions:  On the following slide, you will be shown a flyer about a candidate in an 
upcoming gubernatorial election. 
• Read the pamphlet carefully, as you will be asked a few questions pertaining to it on 
the following page. 
• Then, you will be shown another and asked questions about this second flyer as well. The 
2 candidate flyers you will see are randomly assigned, unrelated, and should be 
considered independently of one another. This study is conducted with the 
understanding that some election cycles, and some candidates, produce significantly 
different levels of engagement on the part of eligible voters.  
 
Both experiments involved randomly treating subjects with one of three election flyers. In 
the first experiment, a white man named “Representative Brian Walsh” was intended to cue 
either a perception of a moral, immoral, or morally neutral (control) candidate through a flyer. 
This was achieved by changing only one or two sentences about the candidate between the 
flyers. In the second experiment, a white man named “Representative Michael Tipson” was 
intended to cue either intelligence, unintelligence, or give no intelligence cue at all (control), 
again, by slightly altering the wording on the flyers. All six flyers, three from each experiment, 
encouraged subjects to vote for the candidate described. In both experiments, the fictitious 
candidates were running for governor of an unnamed state in 2017 instead of running for 
president, which the ANES cumulative data reflects. While this constrains the external validity 
of the experiment, using Gubernatorial candidates provided a more realistic study in a post-
presidential election year. Additionally, using fictitious gubernatorial candidates may draw fewer 
resemblances to real candidates in high profile national elections. Below are the control flyers 
(stimuli) for the morality and intelligence experiments. 
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Morality Experiment, Control Flyer 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intelligence Experiment, Control Flyer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The control treatments, shown above, have no morality or intelligence cue. Each flyer 
with a positive or negative character trait added a sentence or two to the control flyer along with 
a quote from a supporter. The positive morality treatment for Representative Walsh included 
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“I’m a proud family man whose primary commitment is integrity, and I hope you’ll vote for me 
on May 9th.” The positive morality treatment also included the quote: “‘His weekly volunteer 
work with our local children’s shelter is always appreciated—he’s got a heart of gold!’ –Anne 
D.” The negative morality cue was operationalized by adding “We’ve played by the rules long 
enough, it’s time to get the results the people of this state deserve. I hope you’ll cast your ballot 
for me on May 9th.” This flyer was accompanied by the quote: “‘Rep. Walsh knows loop holes 
and tax breaks are best seen as opportunities for growth and success. He won’t let anything or 
anyone get in his way!’ –Anne D.” Subjects received only one of these three flyers in the 
morality experiment. 
Each subject was also randomly assigned to one of the three flyers for candidate Michael 
Tipson (intelligence experiment). The positive intelligence treatment was cued with the 
following sentence in addition to the information on the control flyer: “My breadth of experience 
ranging from foreign diplomacy to Special Advisor on statewide natural disasters gives me the 
unique experience to help our Commonwealth succeed.” The quote on that pamphlet came from 
a local supporter, Gary L., reading: “His nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize this past year 
demonstrates the candor and dedication he brings to his work, and to our state.”  
The language used on the negative intelligence pamphlet is a bit less obvious since a 
realistic informational election flyer would portray a candidate in his or her best light. However, 
this was operationalized by focusing on a lack of experience or expertise for governmental 
matters—similar to a lack of “knowledgeability” used in the ANES question wording. The 
unintelligent treatment portraying Michael Tipson, read: “I’ve lived in this state all my life—as 
your neighbor. I believe this job can be well done by a local like me, even if I lack the experience 
or expertise of the former Governor.” The supporting quote reads: “‘Mike coached our kids 
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baseball team fulltime—he’s always taking on new projects, and this time, he wants to give back 
to his home state!’ –Gary L.” 
Before receiving one flyer from each experiment, subjects responded to some questions 
about their political behavior and identity. They were prompted to report their age, race, and 
formal educational attainment. Then, subjects were asked how much they cared about the 
outcome of the 2016 U.S election and whether they had voted, registered, or did neither in the 
2016 presidential election. The personal demographics were used to observe moderating 
variables and test hypotheses four and five. The political engagement questions provided context 
for the external validity of the experiment. It is important to note that the average self-reported 
voting rates and voter interests among subjects was higher than the national, constraining the 
external validity of the experiment. This may be because of social desirability bias or due to the 
studies’ self-selecting nature.  
After answering these questions, the subjects were shown one of three flyers, randomly 
assigned, from one of the two experiments. After reading it, the subject responded to six 
questions, each on a 7-point scale. These six questions are the dependent variables. The first four 
questions asked about the likelihood of the subject to vote, campaign, donate, and encourage 
their peers to vote in the election. The fifth question asked about the perceived relative morality 
or intelligence of the candidate presented on the flyer, depending on which experiment was 
treated first. This fifth question is intended to gauge how successfully the morality or intelligence 
cue was received. Finally, the sixth question on both experiments asked how much pride the 
subject felt towards the fictitious candidate. Then, a second flyer from the remaining experiment 
was shown and the same six questions were asked; again, the fifth question gauged the relevant 
personality cue of the experiment, and thus differed depending on the experiment.  
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Subject Recruitment and Data Collection 
 Given certain confidentiality and privacy concerns raised during the Institutional Review 
Board approval process, subject recruitment for the experiment was self-selecting via a public 
online link to the experiment (Appendix 2). In order to keep responses confidential and IP 
addresses unmarked, an open, anonymous link on Qualtrics.com was used instead of an invite-
only process. However, a public link published on facebook and email listserv’s poses some 
limitations in obtaining a robust sample. Opt-in experiments tend to draw participation from 
friends of the investigator, individuals who are already politically engaged, and increases the 
likelihood of a homogenous group across race, gender, sex and political ideology. I tried to 
mitigate these concerns by sending the public link to peers who are enrolled in graduate schools, 
other universities, and high schools across the states and asked them to publish the link on their 
feeds.  
 Ultimately, during an eight day data collection period from February 1st to February 8th, 
2017, 295 respondents completed the survey, with 3 respondents skipping 1 or more questions 
each. Where respondents skipped a question, it is treated as a missing value. Below are some 
cross tabulations of demographic information (Qualtrics Final Report, Qualtrics.com). For full 
reference, see Appendix 1. It is important to note that white 20 and 21 year olds are 
overrepresented in this sample which qualifies the generalizability of the experimental results. 
Additionally, racial minority groups and individuals with low levels of education are 
underrepresented. 
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Self-Reported Voting Behavior of Sample 
Before interpreting the data from the experiments, it is important to understand and 
discuss the self-reported voting behavior of the sample. This section will offer some reasons why 
the self-reported voting behavior of the sample does not reflect national voting rates. Since the 
average voter turnout among youths has hovered between 30 and 50 percent of the total 
population across the past fourteen national election cycles, the data from this sample should 
produce similar results (U.S Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Select Years). Ideally, a 
robust sample without a social desirability bias for this experiment would report voting in the 
2016 election with a rate between 30 and 50 percent. However, 81.23% of all respondents 
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reported voting in 2016 with only 2.39% of all respondents reporting they did not register and 
another 5.80% of respondents reporting they registered, but did not vote. A few potential 
explanations are offered below for the divergence from existing census data, and then a 
justification is offered for the continued relevance of the study despite these data.  
Many reasons may help explain why over 80% of the respondents reported voting in the 
2016 election. Here, I would like to offer five. First, as discussed above, there is an oversampling 
of college educated subjects. Among formally educated youths, a deeper understanding of the 
issues and inclination to vote develops (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 2007). Second, as Plutzer 
(2002) notes, a college degree or university environment functions as a resource, which may tip 
the cost-benefit scale towards voting. On campuses, registration is significantly easier than off 
campuses, and civic engagement through extracurricular activities may become normative 
behavior. These factors bring down the cost of voting (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 2007, 60).  
A third reason this sample may report high voter turnout is a social desirability bias. 
Indeed, voting is “good” behavior, and people tend to remember or over report voting and voter 
registration, even when no one is watching. Indeed, Silver, Anderson and Abramson (1986) 
found that college educated subjects are the individuals most likely to over report voter 
participation because it is socially desirable. College students tend to have strong political views 
and “want to appear to be in conformity with social norms,” as Silver et al. write (Silver et al. 
1986, 614). A fourth possible explanation for the elevated reported voter turnout in my sample is 
the nature of the 2016 election. As Marcus and Mackuen (1993) note, enthusiasm and anxiety 
may produce greater attentiveness on the part of the individual, and can vary from one election to 
the next. This explanation would make the 2016 election cycle an exception, or highly emotional 
cycle.  
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A fifth contributing factor to the high rate of self-reported voting behavior is related to 
the fact that most subjects are college educated. Additionally, most subjects contacted are my 
peers—they may be in the Political Science Department themselves, or engaged in political 
research. Peers who are most inclined to spend 5-10 minutes on a political survey are probably 
the individuals interested in politics and voting.  
The data from the experiment supports these explanations. On a 7-point Likert scale, 
ranging from “not at all” to “a great deal,” only 8.50% of respondents reported caring a 4 or less 
about the results of the 2016 presidential election. Interestingly, and conforming with Silver et 
al.’s theory about education and social desirability bias, not a single 23 or 24 year old reported 
caring a 3 out of 7 or less. Among 23 and 24 year olds, only one respondent reported caring a 
degree of 4 on the 7 point scale, and one respondent reported caring a degree of 5 out of 7. 
Ultimately, 2016 was a highly salient and emotional election cycle which may have produced 
greater turnout, or at least the desire to report turning out among educated voters. The self-
reported voting data are presented below (Qualtrics Report, Appendix 1). 293 of the 295 
respondents answered the question; the other two respondents are treated as missing. 
“On a scale of 1 to 7, how much do you care about the 2016 U.S presidential election results?” 
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“In the 2016 U.S presidential election, did you…” 
 
Variable 
Value 
Answer Percent Count 
1 Vote 81.23% 238 
2 Register Only 5.80% 17 
3 Not Register 2.39% 7 
4 Not Sure 0.68% 2 
5 Not applicable; I was not eligible to register 9.90% 29 
 TOTAL 100% 293 
 
The justification for reliance on a sample that is composed of individuals who are more 
educated, more civically engaged, more likely to vote, and younger than the average U.S 
population is twofold. First, while this sample is not a representative cross cut of the American 
youth, the 2016 election cannot be considered a standard bearer for youth engagement or self-
reported voting due to the high emotionality of the major candidates’ platforms and rhetoric.  
More importantly, however, the data from this experiment is coupled with the ANES 
cumulative data file. Therefore, while the external validity of this experiment is qualified, there 
is support for its validity from the representative sample in the ANES cumulative data. The 
ANES data provides the external validity of the representative sample but cannot provide a 
causal link between candidate traits and turnout. This is due to the multitude of variables in an 
uncontrolled environment. Thus, the ANES data offers the external validity lacking in this 
experiment. This study offers the internal validity of treatment manipulation and variable 
isolation. Taken together, evidence of a causal link may be found to underpin the correlation in 
the representative sample of the ANES.  
In summation, while the voting behavior of the sample does not reflect the true national 
average for 18-24 year olds, there is still merit in the results. They offer internal validity for 
drawing a causal link between the independent and dependent variables.  
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Effects of Intended Morality Treatment: Experiment 1  
 It is important to measure if the treatment, in this case the morality cues, was internalized 
as intended. This section discusses the effect and strength of the manipulation on the 
respondents. Treatment manipulation was operationalized as a question during the experiment. 
The final question of the experiment for all three treatment groups—control, moral cue, and 
immoral cue—asked the respondent on a 7-point Likert scale how much they agreed with the 
statement: “Brian Walsh demonstrates a strong moral character.” A 1 corresponded with 
“strongly disagree,” and a 7 corresponded with “strongly agree.” For the purposes of this 
experiment, all dependent variable response options are assumed to be interpreted with equal 
difference, such that the difference between the response options 1 and 2 is the same difference 
between response options 4 and 5, or any other two consecutive response values. Finally, by 
asking the intended treatment question last, we can ensure that respondents do not know exactly 
what the research is focused on.  
The average response value of the control flyer was a 4.05, demonstrating that on average 
respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement. The treatment group that was 
randomly assigned to the positive morality cue candidate flyer reported an average response of 
4.52 on the 7-point perceived morality scale. This difference of 0.47 mean response between the 
two groups is statistically significant. Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis that both treatment 
groups perceived the morality of their conditions similarly. The treatment group that was 
randomly assigned to the immoral cue reported an average response of 2.80 on the 7-point 
perceived morality question, a difference of -1.24 from the control group. Again, the difference 
in mean responses is statistically significant and thus we can reject the null hypothesis that the 
treatment groups perceived the conditions similarly.  
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 In summation, the control flyer was perceived as neither moral nor immoral, while the 
moral and immoral flyer both conveyed their intended cues. The perceived immorality of the 
immoral treatment was stronger than the perceived morality of the moral treatment. The intended 
treatment for the first experiment was successful. 
Results and Analysis: Experiment 1, Morality 
Introduction 
 With the effectiveness of the treatment for this first experiment discussed, this paper turns 
to the results and analyses of the morality experiment. First, the data will be presented and 
situated within the existing literature. This paper will analyze four dependent variables: the self-
reported commitment to vote, commitment to encourage peers to vote, likelihood to canvas, and 
likelihood to donate. Each treatment group will be discussed within these four types of 
engagement. Hypothesis 1: Among 18-24 year olds, elections with a candidate who is perceived 
as highly moral or immoral will produce a stronger commitment to vote and participate than in 
an election without such a candidate is discussed at each individual question level throughout the 
analysis. Then, two potential moderating variables—age and race—are analyzed and discussed.  
Commitment to Vote 
 
 
The data above show the average commitment on a 7-point scale of each treatment group. 
The positive morality cue, which had its intended treatment effect, did not result in a statistically 
significant difference in a commitment to vote in the fictitious gubernatorial election than the 
control. The flyer containing the immoral cue, however, did increase the self-reported 
Treatment  Mean Response 
(7-point scale) 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard Error P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Control Group 4.7187  0.1683 0.000 [4.3875        5.0500] 
Pos. Moral Cue 4.6588 -0.0592 0.2456 0.807 [-.5434           .4235] 
Neg. Moral Cue 5.1250 0.4063 0.2294 0.078 [-.0452           .8577] 
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commitment to vote among the subjects. Since anxiety and enthusiasm are the two emotions that 
may change voter engagement from one election cycle to another, this data set may suggest 
something about youths’ interpretation of perceived candidate morality (Marcus and Mackuen 
1993). One explanation for this is that the negative morality treatment had more than twice the 
effect than the positive morality treatment. While both treatments worked as intended, the 
stronger cue may have produced a stronger commitment to vote among 18-24 year olds.  
Another possible explanation is that whereas a highly immoral candidate may produce 
feelings of anxiety in a young voter, a highly moral candidate does not produce similar feelings 
of enthusiasm. In a paper written for Research in Organizational Behavior at Harvard Business 
School, Cuddy et al. found that emotional warmth and perceived competence are negatively 
correlated (Cuddy et al. 2011). Thus, if the qualities that made the candidate appear moral, such 
as volunteering on a regular basis also made him appear warm, perhaps he was viewed as less 
competent than the control flyer or immoral candidate. This incompetence may be causing 
decreased enthusiasm among young voters. While warmth and high sense of morality are 
generally related, further research is needed to isolate the effect of a positive sense of morality on 
youths’ commitment to vote.  
To recap, based on a commitment to vote, evidence is found in support of hypothesis 1 
for perceived candidate immorality; evidence was not found in support of hypothesis 1 for high 
candidate morality.   
Commitment to Encourage Peers to Vote 
Treatment  Mean Response 
(7-point scale) 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard Error P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Control Group 3.9375  0.1954 0.000 [3.5529         4.3221] 
Pos. Moral Cue 4.3085 0.371 0.2860 0.194 [-0.19091     0.9350] 
Neg. Moral Cue 4.5929 0.6554 0.2657 0.014 [-0.1324       1.1784] 
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Another way of operationalizing a test of youth voter engagement is through self- 
 
reported likelihood to engage one’s peer group and encourage them to vote. If some young  
person cares about an issue or election, he or she is probably more likely to spend time and effort 
encouraging others to take an interest. The data from Experiment 1 show that once given a cue 
about a candidates’ morality, 18 to 24 year olds are more likely to encourage their peers to vote. 
The negative cue had a relatively stronger effect than the positive cue, though both cues produces 
the same tendency—an increase in commitment. Since the negative morality treatment had a 
greater measurable treatment effect than the positive cue, and produced a greater commitment to 
vote, these results are expected.  
These data are particularly interesting because it might be argued that the costs of 
registration and voting are higher than the costs of encouraging peers to vote. In other words, it is 
easier to encourage others to participate than to participate oneself, and this form of engagement 
still comes with the benefit of feeling socially responsible and abiding by social norms among 
educated youths. Based on the dependent variable “commitment to encourage peers to vote,” 
evidence is found in support of hypothesis 1 for the negative cue. Further research is needed on 
the effect of the positive cue.   
Likelihood to Canvas 
Treatment  Mean Response 
(7-point scale) 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard Error P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Control Group 2.3229  0.1606 0.000 [2.0068        2.6391] 
Pos. Moral Cue 2.6429 0.32 0.2351 0.175 [-0.1429       0.7827] 
Neg. Moral Cue 2.5398 0.2169 0.2185 0.332 [-0.2131       0.6469] 
 
 Canvassing on behalf of a candidate has a high start-up cost and requires many resources. 
It requires candidate knowledge, contact information of a local organizer, and time. Not 
surprisingly then, there is an overall significant drop in likelihood to canvas among youths as 
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compared with the commitment to vote or encourage peers to vote. Due to the similar mean 
response values for the treatment groups who received a cue, the 0.332 and 0.175 p-values for 
the treatment effects precludes the difference between the cues and the control from statistical 
significance. In general, canvassing is not a priority among young voters, and they are honest 
about that. Perhaps there is little to no pressure to say one is likely to canvas, eliminating social 
desirability bias. Considering that this fictitious election is a low profile gubernatorial race, it is 
not surprising that the average response, even when subjects were provided with a cue, have not 
changed with any great strength. Later, this paper will analyze potential moderating variables, 
such as age and race, that might affect participation for different types of participation. With 
respect to the self-reported likelihood to canvas in this experiment, evidence is found in support 
of hypothesis 1 for the positive morality cue and but not for the negative morality cue. 
Likelihood of a Donation  
Treatment  Mean Response 
(7-point scale) 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard Error P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Control Group 2.3646    0.1505 0.000 [2.0683         2.6608] 
Pos. Moral Cue 2.3529 -0.0117 0.2196 0.958     [-0.4439       0.4206] 
Neg. Moral Cue 2.5398 0.1752 0.2047 0.569 [-0.5196       0.2860] 
 
 Donations require all the resources of political canvassing, with the additional resource of 
money. Most young Americans in college or just beyond do not have personal expendable 
income. For that reason, donating becomes a costly form of participation. Indeed, adding a cue 
about morality has little to no effect on the likelihood of a financial contribution. Based on these 
four proxies for youth voter engagement, a cue about candidate morality does affect voter 
participation, but to a stronger degree when the costs are relatively low. Canvassing and donating 
come with the highest costs, voting comes with mild costs, while a simple commitment to urge 
peers to vote comes with the lowest costs.  
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The effect of a morality cue on youth voter participation is most observable when the 
costs of participation are low. The higher the costs to an individual for a given type of 
engagement, the less likely that the perceived high or low morality trait of a candidate can sway 
a young voter’s participation. Thus, when considering financial contributions as a form of 
participation, no evidence for hypothesis 1 if found for either treatment group. In the following 
two subsections, the effects of age and race are discussed as potential moderating variables. 
Since the likelihood to donate and canvas are consistently low among all three treatment groups, 
they are not discussed in the following sections on moderating variables. 
Moderating Variable: Age  
Hypothesis 4: Among 18-24 year olds, age will have a moderating effect on the 
interaction between the candidate traits and self-reported political participation is discussed in 
this section for the first experiment concerning the morality of political candidates. This 
hypothesis is based on existing literature that suggests personal identity or group membership 
can affect voting behavior (Bass and Casper 1999; McDonald 2014). Evidence is found in 
support of hypothesis 4; specifically, older subjects were more likely to vote when given a 
morality cue than younger subjects. One explanation for this is that 23 and 24 year olds have 
more political knowledge, independence, and control of their finances than 18 and 19 year olds. 
In order to assess whether or not age had a moderating effect on the dependent variables, first the 
mean response values of the youngest and oldest age groups are compared. Then, a 
multiplicative regression is used to compare three age categories at once. The two forms of 
participation with the greatest degree of change within the morality treatment groups—
commitment to vote and likelihood to encourage peers to vote—also show the greatest degree of 
difference between the oldest and youngest subjects in the sample. One explanation for this 
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phenomenon is that the oldest group may be experiencing social desirability bias. Once the cue is 
internalized, 23-24 year olds are expected to respond to it. Therefore, it is expected that the lower 
cost forms of participation sway these older individuals more than the younger individuals. The 
youngest subjects in each treatment group also picked up the positive morality cue with 
significant strength. Perhaps because they aren’t used to responding to political information, 
there isn’t as strong a translation to voting behavior as older individuals among the sample. The 
data support hypothesis 1: In the presence of the high and low treatments, the effect is observed 
(increased commitment to vote).  
The interaction of age with the treatment effects also brings to the fore that the oldest 
subjects were the greatest contributors to the observed changes in participation. Despite 23 and 
24 year olds deeper political understanding than 18-19 year olds, they still respond with greater 
political engagement when exposed to the morality treatments, unlike middle aged or elderly 
cohorts. Indeed, older cohorts demonstrate a stronger and less volatile commitment to vote 
regardless of candidate personality cues, as observed in the ANES data. Ultimately, 23 and 24 
year olds have enough political knowledge to process the cue, but may have yet to develop 
consistent voting habits like their older counterparts, termed persistence voting. Below are the 
treatment effects on the youngest and oldest groups. The interaction among three age categories 
of the sample is presented below in a multiplicative regression table.  
Treatment Effect of Morality Cue, 18 and 19 year olds 
Treatment  Mean Response 
(7-point scale) 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard Error P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Control Group 4    0.2272 0.000 [3.548          4.4521] 
Pos. Moral Cue 4.6667 0.6667 0.3470 0.058     [-0.0239       1.3573] 
Neg. Moral Cue 3.1765 -0.8235 0.3068 0.009 [-1.4340      -0.2130] 
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Treatment Effect of Morality Cue, 23 and 24 year olds 
 
Treatment  Mean Response 
(7-point scale) 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard Error P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Control Group 3.7       0.3225 0.000 [3.0195         4.3805] 
Pos. Moral Cue 4.8333 1.1333 0.5266 0.046     [0.0221         2.2445] 
Neg. Moral Cue 2.25 -1.45 0.6033 0.028 [-2.7230      -0.1770] 
 
Treatment Effect of Morality Cue, Interaction Model: Age 
 
The multiplicative regression shows the mean responses between the age categories for 
all three treatment groups. Based on the mean responses, the treatments had the same tendencies 
for the positive and negative cues among the three age groups. Age had a moderating effect on 
the perceived morality of the negative treatment flyers. Among all age groups, the negative 
treatment group produced the greatest degree of statistically significant difference among 20-22 
year olds. Not shown here, the negative effect on 20-22 year olds yielded a p-value of 0.000. In 
part, this may be because most of the sample fell in this age demographic. Therefore, any outliers 
did not pull the mean too far in either direction. Indeed, only 20 respondents were 23 or 24 years 
Treatment 
 
Mean 
Response (7-
point scale) 
Interaction 
Term 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
P-Value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
18-19 yrs, Control 4   0.2084 0.000 [3.5899    4.4101] 
18-19 yrs, Pos. Cue 4.6667 Pos 0.6667 0.3183 0.037 [0.04011  1.2932] 
18-19 yrs, Neg. Cue 3.1765 Neg -0.8235 0.2814 0.004 [-1.3774  -0.2696] 
20-22 yrs, Control 4.1404 20-22 0.1404 0.2545 0.582 [-0.3605   0.6412] 
20-22 yrs, Pos. Cue 4.5172 20-22xPos -0.2898 0.3790 0.445 [-1.0357   0.4562] 
20-22 yrs, Neg. Cue 2.6667 20-22xNeg -0.6502 0.3417 0.058 [-1.3227   0.0224] 
23-24 yrs, Control 3.7 23-24 -0.3 0.4062 0.461 [-1.1000   0.4996] 
23-24 yrs, Pos. Cue 4.8333 23-24xPos 0.4667 0.6524 0.475 [-0.8174   1.7507] 
23-24 yrs, Neg. Cue 2.25 23-24xNeg -0.6265 0.7105 0.379 [-2.0249   0.7720] 
 45 
old. Therefore, any individual’s response bears more weight on the mean than for other age 
categories. Interestingly, though only a few years apart, 20-22 year olds responded to the 
negative and positive morality cue with a bit more strength than 18-19 year olds. However, 18-
19 year olds responded similarly towards the control group as 20-22 year olds. The difference 
between 20-22 year olds and 23-24 year olds was not statistically significant for either treatment 
effect. This paper turns to discuss whether age is also moderating the effect of two low-cost 
forms of participation: a commitment to vote and the likelihood to encourage peers to vote. 
Commitment to Vote, Interaction Model: Age 
Treatment Mean 
Response (7 
point scale) 
Interaction 
Term 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
P-Value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
18-19 yrs, Control 4.3571   0.3056 0.000 [3.756        4.9586] 
18-19 yrs, Pos. Cue 3.9523 Pos -0.4047 0.4668 0.387 [-1.3235    0.5140] 
18-19 yrs, Neg. Cue 4.5151 Neg 0.1580 0.4154 0.704 [-0.6597    0.9758] 
20-22 yrs, Control 4.8947 20-22 0.5376 0.3731 0.151 [-0.1969    1.2720] 
20-22 yrs, Pos. Cue 4.8275 20-22xPos 0.3376 0.5557 0.544 [-0.7562    1.4314] 
20-22 yrs, Neg. Cue 5.3067 20-22xNeg 0.2539 0.5033 0.614 [-0.7368    1.2446] 
23-24 yrs, Control 4.6000 23-24  0.2429 0.5957 0.684 [-0.9296    1.4153] 
23-24 yrs, Pos. Cue 5.5000 23-24xPos 1.3048 0.9566 0.174 [-0.5781    3.1877] 
23-24 yrs, Neg. Cue 6.7500 23-24xNeg 1.9920 1.0429 0.057 [-0.0608   4.0448] 
 
The commitment to vote among different age groups is shown above. There is evidence 
that age had a moderating effect on the treatment effect for the negative morality cue. Indeed, the 
treatment effect was 1.9920 for 23-24 year olds x Negative Cue for the dependent variable 
“commitment to vote,” with a p-value of 0.057. This is consistent with the data in the table on 
the previous page. 23-24 year olds internalized the negative cue with great strength degree, and 
perhaps their commitment to vote, as older individuals, is easier to sway with a negative morality 
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cue than younger subjects. This may be because the costs of voting for 23-24 year olds are easier 
to overcome than for 18-19 year olds; they may already be registered from a previous election 
and more likely to have a permanent address than young college students. Additional testing in 
STATA programming shows that the difference in a commitment to vote for the immoral flyer 
between 20-22 year olds and 23-24 year olds is also statistically significant. The p-value for the 
moderating effect between 20-22 year olds x Negative Cue and 23-24 year olds x Negative Cue 
is .0826. Among individuals in the positive treatment group, there was no observed difference in 
treatment effect between 20-22 year olds and 23-24 year olds.  
 Furthermore, 23-24 year olds reported the greatest increase in commitment to vote when 
shown the positive cue compared to the other age groups. The p-value for the positive cue 
treatment effect on 23-24 year olds was 0.212, while the p-value for the treatment effect on the 
youngest group was 0.410, and 0.825 among 18-19 year olds. While none of these values are 
statistically significant, the greater commitment to vote among 23-24 year olds in the positive 
treatment group may be a testament to the cost-benefit analysis theory of voting. Since each 
group internalized the positive morality cue, some other information helped motivate the 
commitment to vote among 23-24 year olds. In other words, hypothesis 1 is most supported by 
the increased commitment to vote among this oldest age category. 
To conclude, there is evidence of a moderating effect of age on a commitment to vote for 
the negative morality cue treatment. Thus, Hypothesis 4: Among 18-24 year olds, age will have a 
moderating effect on the interaction between the candidate traits and self-reported political 
participation is supported. In general, 23-24 year olds report an overall greater likelihood to vote 
compared to younger respondents.  Now, this paper turns to the effect of age on the likelihood to 
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encourage one’s peers to vote—the least costly form of political participation studied in this 
experiment.  
Commitment to Encourage Peers to Vote, Interaction Model: Age 
Treatment Mean 
Response (7 
point scale) 
Interaction 
Term 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
P-Value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
18-19 yrs, Control 3.75   0.3546 0.000 [3.0519    4.4480] 
18-19 yrs, Pos. Cue 3.6667 Pos -0.0833 0.5417 0.878 [-1.1496   0.9830] 
18-19 yrs, Neg. Cue 3.6765 Neg 0.0735 0.4789 0.878 [-1.0161   0.8691] 
20-22 yrs, Control 4.0175 20-22 0.2675 0.4331 0.537 [-0.5849   1.1200] 
20-22 yrs, Pos. Cue 4.3859 20-22xPos 0.4517 0.6458 0.485 [-0.8194   1.7229] 
20-22 yrs, Neg. Cue 4.9600 20-22xNeg 1.0160 0.5814 0.082 [-0.1285   2.1605] 
23-24 yrs, Control 4 23-24 0.25 0.6913 0.718 [-1.1108   1.6108] 
23-24 yrs, Pos. Cue 5.8333 23-24xPos 1.9167 1.1101 0.085 [-0.2686   4.1019] 
23-24 yrs, Neg. Cue 5.5000 23-24xNeg 1.5735 1.2090 0.194 [-0.8063   3.9534] 
 
In a comparison of the different age groups in the control condition, the likelihood of 
young voters to encourage their peers to vote is similar. However, age produced a moderating 
effect on the likelihood to encourage peers to vote among the positive and negative cue 
treatments. Among individuals in the youngest age group, the likelihood to encourage peers to 
vote actually decreased in both treatment groups when compared to the  control flyer, though 
with little strength. For the middle and older age groups, both the positive and negative morality 
treatments resulted in an increase in likelihood to encourage peers to vote. Additional statistical 
tests in Stata (2014) shows no statistical significance between the treatment effects on 20-22 year 
olds and 23-24 years. Not surprisingly, and consistent with the personal commitment to vote, the 
morality cues produced the greatest change in response among 23 and 24 year olds.  
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For college educated individuals, encouraging peers to vote is socially desirable and low 
cost. On the other hand, 18 and 19 year olds are not in a politically engaged environment, and 
thus may feel less pressure to discuss the election in a peer group. One final point worth noting: 
because 23-24 year olds increased their political participation to the greatest degree when given a 
morality treatment, it can be deduced that the overall treatment effects for both a “commitment to 
vote” and a “commitment to encourage peers to vote” are disproportionately the effect of older 
respondents’ answers. 
Moderating Variable: Race 
 In this part Hypothesis 5: Among 18-24 year olds, race will have a moderating effect on 
the interaction between the candidate traits and self-reported political participation is discussed 
for the first experiment on morality. Ultimately, evidence is found in support of the hypothesis. 
As Wattenberg notes in his 2006 book Is Voting for Young People, individuals tend to vote when 
they care about an issue (Wattenberg 2006). In many cases, people care and vote on issues that 
reflect personal or group interests. Social Identity Voting (SIV), a recent theory that grew out of 
Social Identity Theory, suggests feelings of personal and group identity may affect voting 
behavior among legislators. Pauls et al. maintain this theory in their study which examines social 
identity voting in roll call votes at the congressional level (Pauls et al. 2015, 3).  If group 
membership and identity can motivate voting behavior among politicians, it is worth analyzing 
the potential of Social Identity Voting among constituents, including youths.  
Due to the disproportionately high number of white respondents in the sample, race will 
be analyzed by reference to ‘whites’ and ‘nonwhites.’ This will gauge the differences between 
white and minority turnout behavior. It is widely accepted that Hispanics, Asians and Blacks do 
not have the same voting behavior, or registration rates, and this study acknowledges that (Bass 
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and Casper, 1999; United States Election Project 2014). The intention is not to treat minorities as 
a single social identity, but rather to generate a more accurate, though less precise, understanding 
of the effect of race on voter turnout. One way of gauging if races respond differently to 
candidates is by looking at self-reported levels of interest in the 2016 presidential election 
results. Since President Trump has made particularly inflammatory race-related comments, a 
greater interest among minorities in the 2016 election might be the result of Social Identity 
Voting. While less than 5% of voters from both groups reported caring a 3 or less on a 7-point 
scale, the percentage of those who reported caring a great deal (7) is about 7% greater for 
minorities. Below are the data. 
On a scale of 1-7, how much do you care about the 2016 U.S presidential election results? 
                                                       
                                   Whites                                                                 Nonwhites 
 
If the discrepancy in caring deeply about the 2016 national election between white and 
nonwhite youths is a product of internalized social identity, then perhaps whites and nonwhites 
will respond differently to the treatments in the first experiment. Given that minority groups have 
been systematically discriminated against, a heightened awareness of candidates’ personality and 
voter participation might be expected among nonwhites when shown a highly moral or immoral 
candidate. While both whites and nonwhites responded with the expected tendencies to the 
manipulation check question, the immoral candidate produced a stronger negative reaction from 
nonwhites. The highly moral candidate, however, produced a stronger positive reaction among 
Response Frequency Percent 
1 0 0% 
2 1 0.42% 
3 5 2.11% 
4 13 5.49% 
5 39 16.46% 
6 21 13.08% 
7 148 62.45% 
Response Frequency Percent 
1 1 1.75% 
2 0 0% 
3 1 1.75% 
4 4 7.02% 
5 7 12.28% 
6 4 7.02% 
7 40 70.18% 
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whites. So, among the race categories, whites responded more positively to the “good guy” than 
nonwhites, and nonwhites responded more negatively to the “bad guy” than whites.  
One interpretation of these results is that young minority voters feel more skepticism 
towards the morality of politicians than whites. In September 2016, the New York Times 
published an article revealing voter apathy towards their party’s candidate—Hillary Clinton. One 
young woman told the Times, “What am I supposed to do if I don’t like him and I don’t trust 
her?” The same article noted that young black voters expect a greater amount of diversity among 
candidates than in previous elections: “gone are the days of patience,” said former PA-
Representative Tony J. Payton Jr., for “boilerplate pleas” on racial equality (J. Martin 2016). 
This disaffection towards white candidates, even in one’s own party among young African-
Americans, may be generalized to other races. However, further research is needed to support 
this theory. The underrepresentation of minorities in this experiment may be skewing the data.  
Treatment Effect of Morality Cues, Among Whites  
Treatment  Mean Response 
(7-point scale) 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard Error P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Control Group 4.0493  0.1222 0.000 [3.8087         4.2900] 
Pos. Moral Cue 4.6666 0.6167 0.1823 0.001  [0.2581         0.9765] 
Neg. Moral Cue 2.8666 -1.1827 0.1684 0.000 [-1.5144      -0.8510] 
 
Treatment Effect of Morality Cues, Among Nonwhites 
 
Treatment  Mean Response 
(7-point scale) 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard Error P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Control Group 4.0667  0.2903 0.000 [3.4846        4.6487] 
Pos. Moral Cue 4.2632 0.1965 0.3884 0.615  [-0.5821       0.9751] 
Neg. Moral Cue 2.5652 -1.5015 0.3732 0.000 [-2.2496      -0.7533] 
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Commitment to Vote, Interaction Model: Race  
 
Treatment  
 
Mean 
Response (7-
point scale) 
Interaction 
Term 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Nonwhite, Control 4.8667   0.4243 0.000 [4.0315     5.7018] 
Nonwhite, Pos. Cue 3.9474 Pos. -0.9193 0.5676 0.106  [-2.0364   0.1979] 
Nonwhite, Neg. Cue 5.1044 Neg. 0.4377 0.5453 0.423 [-0.6358   1.5112] 
White, Control 4.6914 White -0.1753 0.4619 0.705 [-1.0845   0.7339] 
White, Pos. Cue 4.8636 WhitexPos. 1.0916 0.6296 0.084 [-0.1477   2.3308] 
White, Neg. Cue 5.0787 WhitexNeg. -0.0539 0.6009 0.933 [-1.2332 1.13243] 
 
 Before discussing the moderating effect of race on morality cues and the change in a 
commitment to vote, it is interesting to note the difference between whites and nonwhites in the 
control. Nonwhites were more likely report a commitment to vote than whites. This may be 
associated with anxieties that minorities feel towards election outcomes that whites do not. 
Recall that nonwhites reported caring more about the results of the 2016 U.S election than 
whites.  
For individuals in the negative treatment group, there is no evidence that race had a 
moderating effect on the independent variables for a reported commit to vote. This is observed 
by the fact that the interaction effect was very small (White x Neg. : -0.0539), and the associated 
p-values and 95% confidence interval show no statistical significance. For individuals in the 
positive morality treatment group, race did have a moderating effect on the relationship between 
candidate morality and a commitment to vote. Whites in the positive cue group self-reported an 
average of 1.0916 points greater commitment to vote than nonwhites. The moderating effect was 
statistically significant with a p-value of 0.084. This difference may be explained by the fact that 
whites found the highly moral candidate 0.4034 points more moral than nonwhites. Among the 
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flyers, this was the greatest difference in treatment manipulation effect between whites and 
nonwhites. This provides support for hypothesis 5. 
Among nonwhites, the positive morality cue—whose treatment was unsuccessful—
resulted in a significantly lower commitment to vote compared to the control group. This may be 
due to skepticism felt towards candidates portraying themselves as highly moral, as discussed in 
the previous section.  The negative morality cue resulted in a slightly higher commitment to vote 
among non-whites, but with a treatment effect of only 0.4377 and p-value of 0.423, this increase 
is not statistically significant. Perhaps among nonwhites, a candidate portraying themselves as 
moral, while not actually viewed as highly moral, manages to create voter apathy due to 
historical context and perceived social identity. Indeed, all six flyers present middle aged white 
men. The effects of perceived social identity should be studied further. Among whites, the 
positive and negative treatment effects worked as intended, and an increased commitment to vote 
for both the moral and immoral candidate is observed. This provides support for hypothesis 1: 
Among 18-24 year olds, elections with a candidate who is perceived as highly moral or immoral 
will produce a stronger commitment to vote and participate than in an election without such a 
candidate for whites.  
In summation, race had a moderating effect on the commitment to vote for individuals in 
the positive treatment group: nonwhites were less likely to vote when exposed to the moral 
candidate than whites. Race had no impact on the change in a commitment to vote for the 
negative morality cue group. In the next section, this paper turns to the moderating effect of race 
on the other low-cost form of participation studied—the likelihood to encourage peers to vote.  
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Commitment to Encourage Peers to Vote, Interaction Model: Race 
 
Treatment  Mean 
Response 
(7-point 
scale) 
Interaction 
Term 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Nonwhite, Control 3.86667   0.4890 0.000 [4.0315      5.7018] 
Nonwhite, Pos. Cue 3.2106 Pos -0.6561 0.6541 0.317  [-2.0364     0.1979] 
Nonwhite, Neg. Cue 4.9566 Neg 1.0899 0.6285 0.084 [-0.6358     1.5112] 
White, Control 3.9507 White 0.0840 0.5323 0.875 [-1.0845     0.7339] 
White, Pos. Cue 4.6309 WhitexPos 1.3363 0.7262 0.067 [-0.1477     2.3308] 
White, Neg. Cue 4.5060 WhitexNeg -0.5405 0.6922 0.436 [-1.2332    1.1324] 
 
Within the control group, whites and nonwhites responded similarly to a commitment to 
encourage peers to vote. Within the negative treatment group, no statistically significant 
evidence is found in support of hypothesis 5. This is observed by the statistically insignificant 
interaction term of -0.5405, and a high p-value of 0.436. However, race did have a moderating 
effect on the positive morality cue. The mean response difference between whites and nonwhites 
in the positive treatment group was 1.4203 for a commitment to encourage peers to vote, with a 
statistically significant difference (P-value: 0.067). Again, the moderating effect might be 
attributed to a lack of trust towards the intentionality of “wholesome white politicians” among 
nonwhites, who reported a lower commitment to encourage peers to vote than whites. The New 
York Times article by Jonathan Martin supports this hypothesis for the 2016 presidential election 
(J. Martin 2016). If nonwhites are unsure of the intention of highly moral white candidates, these 
individuals may be less likely to engage with peers about the election.  
Again, in the negative morality treatment group, there is no evidence that race had a 
moderating role on the commitment to encourage peers to vote. Indeed, both whites and 
nonwhites responded to the negative cue with the same tendency and similar strengths. 
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Specifically, whites and nonwhites were both more likely to encourage peers to vote when given 
a negative morality cue than when given no cue at all. We may expect that nonwhites are far 
more concerned when a candidate appears immoral than when a candidate is trying to ride the 
moral high ground. Additionally, openly immoral candidates may produce the same uncertainty 
among nonwhites about their political intentions that they produce among nonwhites. 
 For whites, then, evidence for hypothesis 1: Among 18-24 year olds, elections with a 
candidate who is perceived as highly moral or immoral will produce a stronger commitment to 
vote and participate than in an election without such a candidate is observed for the 
participation variable “encouraging peers to vote.” However, evidence for hypothesis 1 is found 
only in part for nonwhites. Among nonwhites, while a negative cue does increase the 
commitment to encourage peers to vote (treatment effect:  -0.6561, p-value: 0.317), the positive 
cue did not. Ultimately, race is a moderating variable. It’s interaction effect is observed in the 
White x Pos interaction term, where the effect on the dependent variable has different tendencies 
and strengths between minorities and non-minorities. 
Conclusions 
Evidence for hypotheses 4 and 5 is found in the interaction models for race and age. After 
looking at the data for the first experiment, the strongest evidence is found in support of 
hypothesis 1 for white respondents and the oldest respondents, aged 23 and 24, for the two low-
cost forms of participation. Ultimately, among young individuals, minorities, and the high-cost 
forms of participation like donation and canvassing, little evidence is observed in support of 
hypothesis 1.   
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Intended Effects of Treatment: Experiment 2   
This section begins by discussing the outcome of the intended treatment effects for the 
experiment on candidate intelligence. Then, based on the results of the manipulation check, some 
reasons for these results are discussed.  
The question measuring the treatment of the intelligence experiment, read: “On a scale of 
1 to 7, how strongly do you agree with the following statement: ‘Michael Tipson demonstrates a 
high level of intelligence.’” Mirroring the first experiment, a 1 was labeled “strongly disagree” 
while a 7 was labeled “strongly agree.” The average response for the control group’s flyer was a 
4.02, perceived on average as neither intelligent nor unintelligent. The highly intelligent cue 
received an average response of 5.05, a 1.03 increase from the control group, with a p-value of 
0.000, thus the treatment worked. The unintelligent cue, however, was perceived an average of 
only -.13 points less intelligent than the control flyer. With a p-value of 0.391, the unintelligent 
cue was perceived no differently than the control flyer. 
Ultimately, the control flyer and highly intelligent treatment were perceived as intended, 
while the unintelligent treatment was not successful. One potential reason why the unintelligent 
treatment had little effect is due to the nature of the experiment. It’s difficult to make a candidate 
appear unintelligent on an advertisement promoting that candidate; it’s possible that subjects 
perceived the intended cue as some other information. For example, perhaps Tipson’s 
inexperience was perceived among the treatment group as anti-establishment instead of 
unintelligent.  
Results and Analysis: Experiment 2, Intelligence  
Introduction 
With the effectiveness of the treatment for this second experiment outlined, this  
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section focuses on the results and analyses of the intelligence experiment. First, the data will be 
presented and critically engaged with by analyzing the self-reported commitment to vote, 
likelihood of encouraging peers to vote, likelihood to canvas, and likelihood to donate. Each 
treatment group will be discussed within these four types of engagement. Hypothesis 2: Among 
18-24 year olds, elections with a candidate who is perceived as intelligent or unintelligent will 
produce a stronger commitment to vote and participate than in an election without such a 
candidate is discussed at each individual question level throughout the analysis, with the 
understanding that the negative cue treatment results will limit the scope of possible conclusions.  
Commitment to Vote 
Treatment  Mean Response 
(7-point scale) 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Control Group 4.9118  0.1570 0.000 [3.8087         4.2900] 
Pos. Intelligence Cue 4.9134 0.0016 0.2210 0.994 [-0.4332       0.4366] 
Neg. Intelligence Cue 4.9091 -0.0027 0.2307 0.991 [-1.5144      -0.8510] 
 
 When compared to the control group, the positive treatment had no effect on a 
commitment to vote. The negative cue—which did not have the intended effect—also resulted in 
no difference of commitment to vote from the control. This is interesting because whatever 
information the cue is in fact evoking to the respondents, such as an anti-establishment cue, is 
not affecting a commitment to vote among youths. No evidence is found in support of hypothesis 
2 for a higher “commitment to vote.”  
Likelihood to Encourage Peers to Vote 
Treatment  Mean Response 
(7-point scale) 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Control Group 4.2970  0.1781 0.000 [3.9464          4.6476] 
Pos. Intelligence Cue 4.3173 0.0203 0.2501 0.935 [-0.4332         0.4366] 
Neg. Intelligence Cue 4.5341 0.2371 0.2611 0.365 [-0.2768         0.7509] 
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 The control group, with a mean response of 4.2970, is not a statistically different 
outcome from the positive intelligence cue. Interestingly, the negative treatment group responded 
on average with a 0.2371 increase in a likelihood to encourage peers to vote. While the strength 
of the increase in participation is small, it suggests that the negative intelligence cue conveyed 
something different than the control. This increase among the negative intelligence treatment 
group for this question is similarly observed for the canvassing question. For canvassing, 
however, the negative intelligence cue regression coefficient had greater strength. 
Likelihood to Canvas 
Treatment  Mean Response 
(7-point scale) 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Control Group 2.3267  0.1540 0.000 [2.0236          2.6299] 
Pos. Intelligence Cue 2.4327 0.1060 0.2162 0.624       [-0.3196         0.5315] 
Neg. Intelligence Cue 2.7386 0.4119 0.2257 0.069     [-0.0323         0.8561] 
 
         The likelihood to canvas on behalf of a candidate in this fictitious election is overall  
lower than a commitment to vote or encourage peers to vote. This parallels the results of the 
morality experiment, as canvassing is a high-cost form of participation for young individuals. 
While the mean response for the positive intelligence treatment group was only a 0.1060 greater 
than the control group, the intended negative cue resulted in a 0.4119 increase in a likelihood to 
canvas. If the unintelligence cue did in fact convey an anti-establishment cue to the treatment 
group, this result is interesting. Perhaps young individuals weighed the cost and benefit of 
canvassing for the candidates. For an anti-establishment or non-politician, canvassing may seem 
more fruitful, or be of greater value, than canvassing for an established politician. If this is the 
case, then the subjects in the negative intelligence treatment group demonstrated a cost-benefit 
analysis in their political participation behavior.  
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Likelihood of a Donation  
Treatment  Mean Response 
(7-point scale) 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Control Group 2.4510            0.1450     0.000 [2.1656            2.736] 
Pos. Intelligence Cue 2.2212 -0.2298 0.2040 0.261     [-0.6314         0.1718] 
Neg. Intelligence Cue 2.3068 -0.1442 0.2130  0.499      [-0.5634         0.2751] 
 
 The self-reported likelihood of a donation among 18-24 year olds is very low, on par with 
the likelihood to canvas for a candidate. As a high-cost form of participation that requires many 
resources, financial contributions are rare among youths. The fact that youths don’t donate 
money to political campaigns—and politicians don’t expect them to—may contribute to youths 
feeling as though politicians ignore them. In general, politicians tailor their priorities and 
message to likely voters and likely donors. In fact, in an article by Susie Poppick for the CNBC 
network, likely donors appear to be even more valued among politicians than likely voters. 
Harvard Professor Stephen Ansolabehere tells Poppick, “Money is fungible in a way that votes 
aren’t,” because money can buy votes in a way that a single vote cannot. On average, $10 has 
been spent in modern elections for every vote won (Poppick 2016). Thus, even if younger voters 
were likely to make only a small donation, politicians would pay far more attention to their 
interests—and perhaps be more accessible to their demographic—in the hopes of reelection. In 
turn, younger voters would be brought into the fold of politics. Below is the average “cost” of a 
vote for the 2016 primaries (Poppick 2016; Federal Election Commission, CNBC Calculations). 
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 Dollars Spent Per Popular Vote, 2016 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
This study, however, resulted in a decreased likelihood of a donation when given a 
positive intelligence cue or a negative intelligence cue among 18 to 24 year olds. If we think 
political participation would likely be consistent across multiple proxies (dependent variables)—
that is, someone who is more inclined to vote in an election would also be more inclined to 
canvas or donate—then this data is inconsistent. Indeed, as discussed under the previous 
subsections, individuals in the positive treatment group responded with an increased commitment 
to canvas and encourage peers to vote when compared to the control group. However, because 
the difference in mean responses between the treatment groups is small for each question, further 
study in needed. The results may be spurious. 
Moderating Variable: Age 
 After by-sorting the data by age category using STATA programming, 20-22 year olds 
were the only category that responded to both intelligence treatment cues as the study intended. 
One possible explanation for this is that 20-22 year olds make up the largest proportion of 
respondents, with 191 of the 295 total respondents making up this age group. This middle age 
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category is most likely to be representative of the true population. Each individual response is 
weighted less heavily and the results are less likely to be skewed by outliers. 
Treatment Effect of Intelligence Cues Among 20-22 Year Olds 
Treatment  Mean Response 
(7-point scale) 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Control Group 4.2623            0.1330  0.000 [3.9999          4.5247] 
Pos. Intelligence Cue 5.1111 0.8488 0.1807 0.000   [0.4922          1.2054] 
Neg. Intelligence Cue 3.8070 -0.4562 0.1913 0.018 [-0.8328       -0.0778] 
 
 The increase in perceived intelligence among 20-22 year olds of the positive intelligence 
candidate was 0.8488 points, a strong difference, and thus the treatment had a different effect on 
this treatment group than the control group. The negative cue also produced the intended change 
of tendency among 20-22 year olds, with a decrease of 0.4553 points in mean response. Since the 
treatment effects worked on this age group, analyzing the commitment the vote through an 
interaction model for the different age groups will indicate if the intended treatments resulted in 
an increased likelihood to vote. 
Commitment to Vote, Interaction Model: Age  
Treatment 
 
Mean 
Response (7-
point scale) 
Interaction 
Term 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
P-Value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
18-19 yrs, Control 4.6176   0.2662 0.000 [4.0936    5.1416] 
18-19 yrs, Pos. Cue 4 Pos -0.6176 0.4044 0.128 [-1.4136   0.1784] 
18-19 yrs, Neg. Cue 4.6086 Neg -0.0090 0.4154 0.983 [-0.8338   0.8159] 
20-22 yrs, Control 5 20-22 0.3824 0.3322 0.251 [-0.2716   1.0363] 
20-22 yrs, Pos. Cue 5.2083 20-22xPos 0.8260 0.4863 0.091 [-0.1313   1.7832] 
20-22 yrs, Neg. Cue 4.8947 20-22xNeg -0.0963 0.5073 0.850 [-1.0949   0.9023] 
23-24 yrs, Control 5.3333 23-24 0.7157 0.6873 0.299 [-0.6373   2.0686] 
23-24 yrs, Pos. Cue 5.3333 23-24xPos 0.6176 0.9832 0.530 [-1.3177   2.5529] 
23-24 yrs, Neg. Cue 5.8750 23-24xNeg 0.5506 0.9372 0.557 [-1.2941   2.3954] 
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Before considering the moderating effect of age on a commitment to vote, consider the 
mean responses among 20-22 year olds for a commitment to vote. It is important to observe the 
differences in the treatment groups among 20-22 year olds because this group perceived the 
treatments as the experiment intended. Since the manipulation worked for this age category, the 
results will reflect causal effect of the intended treatment cues. Among 20-22 year olds, the 
positive cue mean result was 0.2083 higher than the control for a commitment to vote. Among 
20-22 year olds, the unintelligent flyer resulted in a 0.1053 decrease in a commitment to vote. 
Based on the available data, then, evidence for hypothesis 2 is not found for both treatment cues. 
While the positive cue resulted in an increased commitment to vote among 20-22 year olds, the 
negative cue did not.  Strikingly, among 18-19 year olds and 23-24 year olds, the positive cue did 
not produce a greater inclination to vote.  
Age is moderating the effect of the treatments on a commitment to vote for the positive 
treatment group. Note the statistically significant p-value of 0.091, showing 20-22 year olds 
responded differently to the positive cue than 18-19 year olds. Interestingly, the older the 
respondent the more likely they are to commit to vote for all three treatments. Their baseline 
political engagement is higher than younger individuals. 18-19 year olds average response for the 
control group is only 4.617, 20-22 year olds average response is a 5, and 23-24 year olds self-
report a commitment of 5.3333 on the 7-point Likert scale. Additional statistical tests show no 
moderating effect of age between 20-22 year olds and 23-24 year olds for either treatment flyer. 
For the intelligence cue experiment, support for Hypothesis 4: Among 18-24 year olds, age will 
have a moderating effect on the interaction between the candidate traits and self-reported 
political participation is found for the positive cue but not the negative cue. 
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Among 18-19 year old individuals, the positive cue resulted in a decreased commitment 
to vote when compared to the control. Among 20-22 year olds, the positive cue resulted in an 
increased commitment to vote compared to the control group. Finally, among 23-24 year olds, 
the positive cue resulted in no change when compared to those individuals who received the 
control flyer. This means each age group responded to the positive cue with a different tendency 
for a “commitment to vote.” The negative treatment had similarly different effects among the age 
groups when compared to the control flyer. 
To summarize, unlike morality, intelligence cues had little effect on a commitment to 
vote. The data show little consistency or pattern in responses among treatments or across age 
categories. This is not surprising since the age categories internalized the treatments differently 
from one another.  
Along with a commitment to vote, encouraging peers to vote is a comparatively low-cost 
form of participation that generally produced a larger commitment to participate than donating or 
canvassing. A compelling question is if, and how, age affected the willingness of young people 
to encourage their peers to vote. Since the morality experiment resulted in a significantly greater 
commitment among the oldest age group, this study hypothesizes that a similar interaction will 
be observed for the intelligence experiment. 
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Commitment to Encourage Peers to Vote, Interaction Model: Age  
Treatment 
 
Mean 
Response 
(7-point 
scale) 
Interaction 
Term 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
P-Value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
18-19 yrs, Control 3.8485   0.3082 0.000 [3.2419    4.4550] 
18-19 yrs, Pos. Cue 3.5769 Pos -0.2716 0.4642 0.559 [-1.1853   0.6422] 
18-19 yrs, Neg. Cue 4.1739 Neg 0.3254 0.4808 0.499 [-0.6211   1.2719] 
20-22 yrs, Control 4.4590 20-22  0.6105 0.3825 0.112 [-0.1425   1.3635] 
20-22 yrs, Pos. Cue 4.6111 20-22xPos 0.4237 0.5571 0.448 [-0.1313   1.7832] 
20-22 yrs, Neg. Cue 4.5614 20-22xNeg -0.2230 0.5810 0.701 [-1.0949   0.9023] 
23-24 yrs, Control 5.1667 23-24 1.3182 0.7856 0.094 [-0.2283   2.8646] 
23-24 yrs, Pos. Cue 4 23-24xPos -0.8951 1.1226 0.426 [-3.1047   1.3145] 
23-24 yrs, Neg. Cue 5.3750 23-24xPos -0.1171 1.0701 0.913 [-2.2236   1.9894] 
 
 Unlike the “commitment to vote” dependent variable, age had no moderating effect on 
the treatment for the “commitment to encourage peers to vote” variable. Additional testing shows 
that the difference in treatment effect between 20-22 year olds and 23-24 year olds is also not 
statistically significant. However, older subjects were more likely to report encouraging peers to 
vote in general. This is not related to the treatment effects, but instead reflects that older subjects’ 
overall willingness to encourage peers to vote is higher than for younger subjects. The positive 
correlation between age and mean response may be environmental. As peers age and begin 
voting, obtaining and exercising political knowledge in conversation becomes a social norm—
especially among those with a college degree. Among 23 and 24 year olds, encouraging peers to 
vote is relatively easy, and importantly, praiseworthy. Surprisingly, however, when compared 
with the control, the positive intelligence treatment group resulted in a -1.1667 decrease among 
23 and 24 year olds. One possible reason for the difference between 23-24 year olds and 18-19 
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year olds in the positive cue group is outliers. With only 20 respondents comprising this group, a 
few individuals could greatly skew the data.  
In conclusion, age did have a moderating effect on the treatment in the experiment for a 
commitment to vote. Additionally, age affects the overall likelihood that an individual is willing 
to encourage their peers to vote in a nonexperimental setting. However, evidence for hypothesis 
5 for the dependent variable “encourage peers to vote” is not found for the positive or negative 
treatment cues. Indeed, there is no evidence that age groups responded differently to the 
treatment effects when asked if they would encourage peers to vote. 
Moderating Variable: Race 
 While race proved to be a pertinent factor for the morality experiment, the same was not 
found for the intelligence experiment. Thus, Hypothesis 5: Among 18-24 year olds, race will 
have a moderating effect on the interaction between the candidate traits and self-reported 
political participation is not backed by the data for the intelligence experiment. One theory, 
threaded through this experimental analysis, is that the study did not produce the expected 
negative intelligence treatment effect and thus, data interpretation must be qualified. A second 
theory is that perceived morality is qualitatively different than intelligence. Historically 
marginalized populations may feel a personal stake in ensuring a moral candidate is elected, and 
that an immoral candidate is blocked from office. However, perceived intelligence may not 
produce the same outcome. An intelligent or unintelligent candidate may not shift the incentives 
of participation across racial lines. This theory is supported by the fact that the intelligence cues 
were interpreted similarly between racial categories.  
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Treatment Effect of Intelligence Cues, Among Whites 
Treatment  Mean Response 
(7-point scale) 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Control Group 4.0488  0.1220 0.000 [3.8082          4.2892] 
Pos. Intelligence Cue 5.0941 1.0453 0.1220 0.000   [0.7083          1.3822] 
Neg. Intelligence Cue 3.8732 -0.1756 0.1791 0.328 [-0.5284         0.1773] 
 
Treatment Effect of Intelligence Cues, Among Nonwhites 
 
The positive intelligence treatment effect worked on whites and nonwhites where 
the negative treatment effect had no effect. Since whites and nonwhites responded similarly to 
the flyers in this experiment, it can be anticipated that race will have no moderating effect on the 
commitment to vote and the likelihood to encourage peers to vote. If there had been a stronger or 
different point of view on the candidates between whites and nonwhites, then a difference in 
commitment to vote would have been expected. 
Commitment to Vote, Interaction Model: Race  
Treatment Group 
 
Mean Response 
(7-point scale) 
Interaction 
Term 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Nonwhite, Control 4.7   0.3548 0.000 [4.0016     5.3984] 
Nonwhite, Pos. Cue 5.0 Pos 0.3 0.5084 0.556 [-0.7006    1.3005] 
Nonwhite, Neg. Cue 4.4118 Neg -0.2882 0.5234 0.582 [-1.3186    0.7421] 
White, Control 4.9634 White 0.2634 0.3957 0.506 [-0.5155    1.0423] 
White, Pos. Cue 4.8941 WhitexPos -0.3692 0.5646 0.514 [-1.4805    0.7419] 
White, Neg. Cue 5.0281 WhitexNeg 0.3529 0.5832 0.546 [-0.7950    1.5010] 
 
Treatment  Mean Response 
(7-point scale) 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Control Group 3.95  0.1810 0.000 [3.5869          4.3131] 
Pos. Intelligence Cue 4.8947 0.9447 0.2593 0.001  [0.4245          1.4650] 
Neg. Intelligence Cue 4 0.05 0.2670 0.852 [-0.4856         0.5857] 
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 As hypothesized in the previous section, there is no evidence that race has a moderating 
effect on a commitment to vote in Experiment 2. Each treatment group effect, sorted by race, 
resulted in a 95% confidence interval that crossed 0.0.  Among whites, the intelligence cues 
resulted in no change compared to the control group, each mean response falling within one tenth 
of a point of the control. Among nonwhites and whites, perceived positive intelligence in a 
candidate does not affect a commitment to vote with significant strength. Perhaps this is because 
young voters are harder to mobilize to vote. Appearing “intelligent” as an elected official is 
nothing to write home about, and will not motivate nonvoters to vote. Since the unintelligent cue 
was not perceived as the study intended, it is interesting that the flyer affected whites and 
nonwhites’ commitment to vote differently. Whites reported a 5.0282 average commitment to 
vote on a 7-point scale, while nonwhites reported a 4.4118 commitment to vote for the same 
candidate. It is incumbent upon researchers in this field to design a study testing the effects of 
“political outsider” candidates on youth voter turnout. The negative intelligence treatment may 
have had that effect on the subjects due to the language used on the flyer.   
Commitment to Encourage Peers to Vote, Interaction Model: Race 
 
Treatment  
 
Mean 
Response 
(7-point 
scale) 
Interaction 
Term 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Nonwhite, Control 4.1052   0.4118 0.000 [3.2946        4.915] 
Nonwhite, Pos. Cue 4.3157 Pos 0.2105 0.5824 0.718 [-0.9360      1.356] 
Nonwhite, Neg. Cue 4.2105 Neg 0.0124 0.5993 0.984 [-1.1672      1.192] 
White, Control 4.3415 White 0.2362 0.4570 0.606 [-0.6635      1.135] 
White, Pos. Cue 4.3176 WhitexPos -0.2343 0.6454 0.717 [-1.0314      1.591] 
White, Neg. Cue 4.6338 WhitexNeg 0.2800 0.6663 0.675 [-0.7950    1.5010] 
 
For the dependent variable “commitment to encourage peers to vote” the mean responses  
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 for whites and nonwhites within all three treatment groups are similar. There is no evidence that 
race is moderating the effect of the intelligence cues on the dependent variable. In all three 
treatments, the mean response for non-whites was slightly lower than the mean response for 
whites. Since the negative intelligence cue did not have its intended effect, it is interesting that it 
had the greatest degree of difference in mean response between whites and nonwhites. Studying 
the information that was conveyed by the negative cue, and particularly whether the cue was 
related to candidate personality traits, will contribute to the body of literature on voter turnout 
theories.  
 The fact that race had a stronger moderating effect on Experiment 1 (morality cues) than 
the Experiment 2 (intelligence cues) is not surprising. As discussed under the section Moderating 
Variable: Race for experiment 2, intelligence and race may be qualitatively different factors. 
Historically in U.S politics, the morality of a candidate affected different racial groups much 
differently. Intelligence of a candidate, on the other hand, is not informed by unique racial 
histories. 
Conclusions 
When considering the entire sample population for Experiment 2, any evidence for 
hypothesis 2 must be reproduced in the future, given the failure of the negative intelligence 
treatment in this study. However, for one cross section of the population, 20-22 year olds, the 
negative cue treatment did work as intended as observed through the manipulation check. Thus, 
meaningful conclusions can be drawn from this subsample for Experiment 2. Among 20-22 year 
olds, there is no evidence in support of the hypothesis 2 for the negative treatment group.  
One possible explanation for this lies in the cumulative ANES data. Recall that among 
the three variables correlated with youth voter turnout—perceived candidate intelligence, 
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candidate morality, and feeling pride in a candidate—intelligence had the lowest correlation. 
Thus, it is expected that perceived candidate intelligence has a lower effect on political 
participation than morality. However, this study pursued the possibility that taking pride in a 
candidate may be correlated through perceived candidate intelligence. Under the section 
Morality, Intelligence, and Pride, these experiments do find a positive correlation between 
perceived high intelligence, perceived high morality, and feelings of pride in that candidate. 
However, this positive correlation is not causal, and does not contribute to increased voter 
participation in the intelligence experiment. Ultimately, the internal and external validities of this 
experiment are mitigated by the difficulty of making a fictitious candidate appear unintelligent 
on an advertisement.  
Morality, Intelligence, and Pride 
 This final section tests the correlation between morality, intelligence and pride. 
Hypothesis 3 states Among 18-24 year olds, candidates who are perceived as highly intelligent 
or highly moral are more likely to be a candidate to take pride in than candidates who are not 
perceived as highly intelligent or moral. In the ANES data, a strong correlation between taking 
pride in a candidate and youth voter turnout was found (www.electionstudies.org 2010). 
However, as discussed, operationalizing a candidate who young people take pride in is difficult. 
It is difficult to isolate a variable that can represent pride alone without other confounding 
variables. Ultimately, in an experimental setting, the internal validity of operationalizing 
variables is difficult to maintain for independent variables like “pride.”  
However, analyzing whether the candidates who were perceived as highly moral and  
highly intelligence were also perceived as a candidate to take pride in will contribute to the 
literature. If there is a strong correlation between morality and pride and intelligence and pride, 
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then this experiment finds consistent correlations as found in the ANES data. While these 
correlations cannot draw a causal relationship between pride and youth voter turnout, they 
illustrate the need for future study of the independent variable “candidate pride.”  
Morality and Pride 
 
The question testing this correlation in the study read, “On a scale of 1 to 7, how strongly 
do you agree with the following statement: ‘Brian Walsh demonstrates a strong moral 
character.’” The 7-point response scale ranged from ‘1- Strongly disagree’ to ‘7- Strongly agree.’ 
The treatment group that received the control flyer neither agreed or disagreed with the pride 
question. This is to be expected as no personality cue was given. The positive treatment cue 
resulted in a 0.3420 increase in feelings of pride towards Brian Walsh. This was statistically 
significant with a low p-value of 0.055. The candidate flyer that was perceived as immoral was 
also a candidate that individuals did not take pride in. This is an interesting result because while 
it was anticipated (based on the ANES data) that particularly high feelings of pride would be 
correlated with an increased commitment to vote, it was not anticipated that particularly low 
feelings of pride would be correlated with low perceptions of morality.  
In summation, evidence for hypothesis 3 Among 18-24 year olds, candidates who are 
perceived as highly intelligent or highly moral are more likely to be a candidate to take pride in 
than candidates who are not perceived as highly intelligent or moral is found in Experiment 1, 
looking at the morality treatment effects. This reproduces the correlation observed in the ANES 
Treatment  Mean Response 
(7-point scale) 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard Error P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Control Group 3.9263  0.1209 0.000 [3.6882            4.1644] 
Pos. Moral Cue 4.2683 0.3420 0.1777 0.055     [-0.0078          0.6917] 
Neg. Moral Cue 2.7143 -1.2120 0.1644 0.000 [-1.5357         -0.8883] 
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cumulative data file. The next section discusses the correlation between intelligence and pride 
based on the second part of hypothesis 3. 
Intelligence and Pride 
 
Overall, individuals given the Tipson control flyer felt slightly more pride towards the 
candidate than individuals given the Walsh control flyer.  The positive intelligence cue resulted 
in a higher feeling of pride in the experiment by 0.5275 points. This is to be expected as 
intelligent politicians are generally respected among the electorate. The negative intelligence cue 
also resulted in a higher level of pride compared to the control group. This provides some insight 
into the possible interpretation of the negative intelligence cue that was not internalized as 
intended. Since we know the negative intelligence cue resulted in higher feelings of pride than 
the control, we can interpret that the negative intelligence candidate was internalized as a 
positive candidate in some respect. This provides some support for the theory that the candidate 
was internalized as a political outsider who isn’t entrenched in the establishment.  
Ultimately, the positive intelligence cue resulted in a stronger change in feelings of pride 
than the negative intelligence cue. Thus, evidence in support of hypothesis 3 Among 18-24 year 
olds, candidates who are perceived as highly intelligent or highly moral are more likely to be a 
candidate to take pride in than candidates who are not perceived as highly intelligent or moral is 
found. This correlation supports the correlations between pride and voter turnout in the ANES 
data. Future research is needed to draw a causal link between taking pride in a candidate and 
Treatment  Mean 
Response (7-
point scale) 
Treatment 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Control Group 4.1  0.1104 0.000 [3.6882              4.1644] 
Pos. Intelligence Cue 4.6275 0.5275 0.1553 0.001      [0.2216              0.8332] 
Neg. Intelligence Cue 4.3977 0.2977 0.1614 0.066 [-0.0200             0.6153] 
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political participation among youths. This experimental design did not allow for the internal 
validity necessary to test perceived candidate pride. 
Conclusion 
Voter turnout among youths has been in steady decline since the 1960s in American 
presidential elections. This trend poses a paradox for cost-benefit analysis theories in the existing 
literature. The cost-benefit theories posit that fewer barriers to voting—such as higher education 
and an increased access to information—should result in greater voter turnout, which has not 
been observed (Brody 1978). Within this broader decline, there is marked fluctuation in turnout 
from election to election among youths. Older cohorts, on the other hand, vote at more consistent 
rates over time. This poses a second problem for the existing literature: “What factors could be 
changing from election to election that only affect young voters?”  Emotionality, candidate traits, 
and other behavioral factors have been identified as possible independent variables in the 
literature, and this study builds on those theories to test candidate traits as causes of youth voter 
turnout. This study utilizes those theories along with the positive correlations in the American 
National Election Survey cumulative data file to identify candidate “morality” and 
“knowledgeability/ intelligence,” as well as “taking pride in a candidate” as potential 
independent variables affecting youth voter turnout. The ANES is valuable for its large, 
nationwide, and representative sample which fortifies its external validity. However, the ANES 
cannot draw causal relationships between candidate traits and youth voter turnout because of its 
nonexperimental nature.  
The online experiment conducted in this study, involving 295 18-24 years olds, tested for 
evidence of a causal link between candidate morality and candidate intelligence with youth 
political participation across multiple dependent variables; they included: voting, encouraging 
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peers to vote, donating, and canvassing. This study provided the internal validity and 
experimental setting that the ANES does not have. However, this experiment does not afford the 
same external validity granted by the comprehensive capacity of the ANES cumulative file.  This 
study also looked at the correlation between “taking pride in a candidate” and “candidate 
morality,” as well as the correlation between “taking pride in a candidate” and “candidate 
intelligence.” The research aimed to test if the correlations found in the ANES were reproduced 
in this study. Future research is needed to draw a causal link between taking pride in a candidate 
and voter turnout among youths. This study focused only on the correlation between candidate 
pride, intelligence and morality.  
This paper contributes five major findings to the literature. First, among 18-24 year olds, 
evidence is found that political participation is higher when a candidate appears highly moral or 
immoral than when no information about morality is internalized. This relationship is strongest 
for a negative (immoral) cue. Second, among 18-24 year olds, when participants were treated 
with a highly intelligent candidate flyer, they were more likely to vote and engage in political 
participation than when no information about intelligence was given. Further study is needed to 
identify the effect of a candidate with low intelligence on voter turnout, as that cue was not 
internalized in this study. Third, among the four types of political participation studied in these 
experiments, the treatments had a greater effect on the low-cost forms of participation (voting 
and encouraging peers to vote) than the high cost forms of participation (donating and 
canvassing). Fourth, race and age both act as moderating variables on the effect that a morality 
cue has on youth voter turnout. For the intelligence experiment, however, only evidence that age 
moderated political participation was found; no evidence that race moderated the effect of the 
intelligence cues on political participation surfaced. Fifth, the positive correlation between 
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finding a candidate highly moral and taking pride in that candidate is observed. This positive 
correlation with pride also holds true for candidates with high intelligence. These data reproduce 
and add to the correlations observed in the ANES between “feeling pride in a candidate” and 
increased voter turnout. 
Understanding youth voter turnout is incredibly important for the landscape of American 
politics. Without a vote, young people relinquish their voices to elites, older cohorts, and special 
interests (Teixera 1984, 4). Democracy functions best when citizens of all demographics exercise 
their civic rights. Furthermore, understanding the causes of young peoples’ voting behavior may 
serve a prescriptive purpose. Identifying the factors that encourage youths to vote can help 
candidates utilize these factors to engage newly enfranchised citizens. This paper contributes to 
the literature towards achieving these ends. However, determining the factors affecting youth 
turnout requires ongoing study as the political and social climate in America continue to change.  
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